




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**Counterforce Strategy With Single-Warhead
Missiles Said Stabilizing**

18030014 Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA,
IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 89 pp 3-12

[Article by Gennadiy Kuzmich Lednev, candidate of technical sciences, senior scientific association Institute of World Economics and International Relations: "Is It Possible to Escape from the Nuclear Blind Alley?"]

[Text] A joint Soviet-American announcement (Geneva, 1985) states that there can be no winners in a nuclear war. It is difficult to overestimate the significance of this conclusion for the improvement of the world situation and the recognition of the uniqueness of all living things: We are speaking about the survival not of any particular nation but of all mankind.

But the arms race continues. What is the reason for the paradoxical situation in which we are accumulating arms which take away the meaning of the concept "victory" in the generally accepted interpretation if one keeps in mind the catastrophic consequences of its application? Is another course of events possible under today's conditions?

Held Captive by Two Concepts

Let us consider the tendency of the arms race with respect to strategic offensive arms (SOA) and their role in guaranteeing the safety of both sides. There are several initial points which reflect an attempt to anticipate the development of events in a nuclear war and formulate conditions which will keep the aggressor from taking such a dramatic step as inflicting a nuclear attack. Actually, these points amount to an answer to the question: On which targets should SOA be used in a counterattack? This is how the degree of risk of the aggressor is defined: The counterbalance to such intentions are the consequences of a counter-attack.

Considering the extreme situations, one can say that the aggressor will be punished by a counterattack which will lead either to mutual destruction or to the restoration of parity of forces at some new, lower level. In the former case this is a counterattack on the cities (the concept of guaranteed destruction which is lower than the concept of retaliation), and the latter—on the SOA of the aggressor (the concept of counterforce). The convincingness of this kind of reasoning is simple to figure: In the former case the aggressor will not attack, knowing that the result will be mutual destruction; in the latter he will not achieve military superiority. It is elementary to fulfill the former task technically (especially with the current quantities of arms), but the latter is much more difficult. And so the sides are faced with a choice: How to develop their own SOA's so as to deprive the aggressor of chances of success?

The simplest solution is provided by the first concept: In order to fulfill the task it is sufficient to keep one's own SOA's at quantitative and qualitative levels that are not too high. The second requires continuous improvement of SOA's so as to make a disabling attack impossible and not to allow the enemy to achieve great superiority in the exchange of blows. This competitive path is fraught not only with a high risk but also with immense intellectual and financial expenditures. One is forced to the conclusion that the development of SOA's by the sides should proceed in a quite specific direction—minimalization of means capable of providing for guaranteed security at the price of the impossibility of nuclear conflict, which is easy to achieve within the framework of the concept of retaliation, the reasonable adequacy of means for which, according to estimates, does not exceed 400 equivalent megatons (or about that).¹

Unfortunately, the obviousness of the reasoning far from always agrees with the real course of events. The potentials for guaranteed destruction are exceeded many times over by both sides although everyone understands that the enemy can only be destroyed once. Why has the apparently obvious absurdity of such a development of SOA become a reality?

Let us formulate the problem as follows: Which of the two concepts reflects the nature of the arms race more precisely? In order to answer this question let us try to imagine the development of events if:

1. A and B adhere to the concept of retaliation.
2. A and B adhere to the concept of counterforce.
3. A and B adhere to opposing concepts.

For a point of departure let us take a situation in which the effectiveness of the attack on protected targets is very low, which corresponds to the initial stage in the creation of missile forces as the basis for SOA.

During the course of progress achievements in various areas of knowledge were transformed into new solutions in military developments, that is, A and B moved in the same direction—from the simple to the complex. In practice this means improvement of the tactical-technical characteristics of the arms systems, which leads to increased probability of destroying the target. It becomes possible to deliver a blow to local objects, for example, control points and launching installations, i.e. to the enemy's forces and to knock the weapon from his hands, depriving him of the capability of an adequate response. This comprises the essence of the first counterforce strike. Let us note that we are not speaking about the intentions of the sides but about objective capabilities of their arms, which when there is mutual suspicion becomes a factor in the real threat and political speculations deliberately dramatize the situation, egging on the arms race with discussions of the enemy's "superiority." In this sense a counterforce weapon is a result of the scientific and technical revolution occurring in a circumstance of mutual mistrust.

At the same time efforts are made to protect the weapons. Silo launchers are created with a high degree of protection; the area of military patrolling of SSBN's [Nuclear-Powered

Ballistic-Missile Submarines] increases (with an increase in the distance of the SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]), which makes it more difficult to fight against this important element of the triad. This can also include repeated duplication in the control and communications systems—the most important element of the SOA, which determines the reliability of the retaliatory strike. Thus the means of attack and defense are developing simultaneously and successes in both areas are quite naturally considered by the opposing side as attempts to gain strategic superiority.²

In order for the first variant to have vital force and for the construction of the SOA to following the concept of retaliation it is necessary to return the specifications of the weapons to the initial level and to veto new developments, that is to place rocket equipment beyond the framework of the scientific and technical revolution. In practice this means restricting new technology with coordinated rigid mutual control. Mutual mistrust, technological inequality, and stereotypes that have been forming for a long time still prevent the implementation of these measures. It is absurd to think that the rocket's control system will use punch cards while in automotive construction they are using high-speed integrated circuits. Weapons will improve as long as certain preconditions are created for this—mutual mistrust and scientific and technical progress.

Thus the concept of retaliation cannot hold back the arms race. At the same time its continuation automatically devalues the concept since as the counterforce characteristics increase the possibility of disabling attack will appear.

Does this mean that the concept guarantees deterrence as long as a disabling attack is impossible? Let us recall the main rule: A victim who must conduct a retaliatory strike on cities is deliberately proceeding toward mutual destruction. What does this assertion mean? Interpretations vary. One can call it a declaration of will, the resolve to undertake a suicidal act out of fear of losing the war or an attempt to make the opponent face the choice of "to defeat or to exist," relying on his common sense. In any event this is an emotional situation the whole world faces. Whether the victim will carry it out or not is mostly a question of psychology. History knows no examples of carrying out a vow on such a scale, but everyone knows that it is frequently impossible on a smaller scale. Finally, why are vows of mutual suicide more convincing than assurances of a real love of peace? When there is a shortage of faith more reliable guarantees of security are needed.

If one reasons formally the concept of retaliation presupposes a changeover from war to complete mutual destruction. Declarations of this kind certainly do not contribute to clarifying the situation. In this case the author is by no means asserting that "this will not happen," that a retaliatory strike on the cities can be ruled out. The author wishes to say something quite different: He simply does not know "how it will be" and doubts that anyone can give a precise answer. Strictly speaking, the possibility of implementation and implementation are not the same thing: The

possibility is a necessary condition but it is not sufficient. To this one can add: The situation is greatly complicated if one considers the combination of this concept and the strategy of a counterattack, when the rockets are launched upon receipt of information about the beginning of the opponent's attack. Here the price of a false alarm in the early warning system can be such that against its background World War II seems like a philanthropic act for limiting the population explosion.

If one is to be completely consistent, then, denying the "rules" for waging "limited" war and "selective" attacks, which have been given currency by the concept of counterforce, one must also take away from the concept of retaliation the possibility of declaring its own "rules." There are rules or there are not. It is most likely that a victim of a nuclear attack will be guided by his own assessments of the situation and predictions here will seem extremely indefinite. Does it follow from this that we must wait until practice provides a nuclear end to our agonizing doubts or (at best) should we rely on the convincingness of retaliation in the eyes of the opponent, who does not know "what will happen" either?

In the language of mathematics, indefiniteness of a solution to a problem does not always mean that in principle there is no solution. It can be the result of an incorrectly selected method of solving the problem or even of posing it. It seems that both are present in this case.

Vows are good for youth forums, but calculations are needed for forming a national strategy. To build a defense policy on emotions, deliberately dooming oneself to the "last and decisive battle," holds no promise. Would it not be better to use calculations to convince the opponent of the "unprofitability" of his attack, to prove to him the impossibility of gaining the advantage as a result of aggression? In other words, we are solving the same problem, but posed differently, since the previous way of posing it produces uncertainty. We estimate the victim's capability of restoring parity by a retaliatory strike. How does the situation change compared to the preceding?

A necessary condition for robbing a bank is the existence of money in it, for otherwise the robbery is not planned unless the robber is a dilettante. With this approach the potential aggressor (robber) refrains from an attack precisely because the strike will not produce "revenue" for him—military advantage. Here the conclusion is based on an analysis of the target possibilities of aggression and not on a belief in the "guaranteed" reaction of the victim (bookkeeping replaces emotions). What "revenue" might motivate the aggressor to strike the blow? It is possible to avoid agonizing reflections on this subject if the calculation shows that an exchange of counterforce holds no promise (for example, the result will be parity at a lower level of arms). It is in this situation that one should assess the "restorative" capacity of the retaliatory counterattack as a factor in deterrence.³

From these positions variant 1 is not viable since it ignores the laws of the scientific and technical revolution and (or) control measures that are too "intimate." Variant 3 is even

more naive since it actually presupposes that one side will unilaterally disarm and then react with a certain delay to the development of the opponent's forces, that is, will go to meet him half way, professing essentially the concept of counterforce only in the role of something costly that is extremely disadvantageous for a superpower. And the appeals "boys, let us live together as friends" can hardly strengthen this position.

Therefore we realize variant 2, which corresponds more to the laws of the scientific and technical revolution than to the emotions. An argument in its favor is the reduction of the size of the charge of the warhead with a simultaneous increase in its precision, which is characteristic of military technical progress, that is, the specific unification of the weapon for carrying out the basic task—destroying the protected enemy targets. Let us add that the accepted threshold capacities of test nuclear explosions also show this (among other things) since with high precision a large capacity is no longer needed. The concept of retaliation requires the direct opposite—increased megatonnage of warheads in response to the increased counterforce of the opponent.

One thing is unquestionable: The arms race is continuing and the counterforce potential is increasing. The more modern the arms become the less convincing the concept of counterforce appears. In any case the development of the SOA is proceeding along the path of increasing the counterforce. At the end of the 20th century it is difficult to dispute this since the total megatonnage of the SOA long ago exceeded reasonable limits of the potential for retaliation. The concept of retaliation is the position of the weak and it certainly does not strive to preserve the status quo, for this is fraught with catastrophe (as a result of the breakthrough in new technology, the aggressors overestimation of his capabilities, and so forth). In order to change the situation he must be equal to the strong. This can be achieved by accepting the rules of the counterforce game, which he does. Let us emphasize again that we are not speaking about the "rules" of waging war: The concept cannot dictate the behavior of the sides in a conflict. We are speaking about the actual tendencies of the arms race with respect to the SOA. The side that declares the strategy of retaliation in this situation reminds one of the flier who puts on his parachute and repeats that he recognizes the laws of gravity.

The uncertainty of the victim's behavior exists objectively and mutual destruction (as one of the variants of this behavior) will always be a retarding factor for the aggressor if he cannot disarm the victim. In this sense the two concepts are the same since they declare or allow such a decisive step. The difference is that the concept of counterforce gives the victim a chance to survive without losing the war if his SOA achieve a balance in the exchange of strikes. Reasoning formally, this concept expands the arsenal of deterrents, adding to the possibility of mutual destruction the possibility of restoration of parity by the retaliatory strike. The lot of the victim is not restricted to a gloomy dilemma—to give up or opt for suicide; there arises another variant of behavior during the course of the

conflict. At the present time this is what determines the differences in the SOA of the sides, the more so since the technological generator of the arms race (scientific and technical revolution) creates the necessary preconditions for this.

Does this mean that the concept of counterforce is creditable and will finally close the question of a nuclear war? One must quite definitely give a negative answer. Yes, the concept expands the victim's possibilities as a result of a counterforce retaliatory strike. But by the same token it opens up possibilities for the aggressor who can, if he wins the race, gain the ability to disarm the victim—then even vows of retaliation will not save him. This situation, of course, is extreme, but it does not logically contradict the concept. Will the previously planned alignment of forces (when it is achieved) not become a motivating factor for aggression even if the victim retains the possibility of retaliation? A 10-fold advantage can be a serious enough argument to place the victim in a dilemma: to capitulate or to opt for mutual suicide. As a result the problem again closes on the behavior of the victim. As was asserted above, in this situation he has no definite solution, that is, the central question of the theory of deterrence remains open as before.

The absence of nuclear war today is certainly no guarantee for tomorrow and no justification for the noted tendencies in the development of SOA since such competition in principle allows leadership with all the consequences that entails. The lack of definiteness of the situation gives the green light to adventuristic searches for "advantageous" variants of strikes, discoveries of "windows of vulnerability," and so forth. The race receives a new impetus both from the ideologist of purely defensive measures and from enthusiasts of directly increasing the counterforce through increasing the quantity and quality of combat systems.⁴ From the standpoint of counterforce logic there is no special difference between the adherents of the two systems since increased defensive capabilities of arms means an increase in their counterforce potential in the eyes of the opponent. This motivates the latter to adopt countermeasures in both directions since being restricted to one involves the risk of falling behind in the arms race.

A question is appropriate here: Is a disabling strike an inevitable result of the arms race? The answer depends on the conditions in which it will proceed. Calculations for an uncontrolled arms race indicate a reduction of stability by the year 2000 precisely because of the growth of the counterforce.⁵ Even deep cuts in the SOA (50 percent) are ineffective if they are made purely according to the quantitative principle without respect to the systems with high counterforce potential.

Completing the first part of our reflections we conclude: The concept of counterforce does not make it possible to break out of the vicious circle of the arms race and, moreover, directs it into new channels, involving more and more financial and intellectual means, and as a result not only is the problem of preventing war not solved, but it

also objectively leads to a reduction of the stability as a result of mutual growth of the counterforce.⁶

One could get the impression that attempts to limit the dangerous competition hold no promise, that the movement toward a general catastrophe is predetermined since this movement agrees with the laws of the scientific and technical revolution. The prospects of universal destruction or life with the fear of this outcome are certainly not attractive. The task is to find alternatives, mutually acceptable steps to avoid this. Is it possible in the foreseeable future to achieve a high degree of stability without violating the laws of the scientific and technical revolution? Not being in a position to ban the scientific and technical revolution, we shall try to find such a path while remaining within the framework of the counterforce logic.

From Mutual Deterrence to Mutual Restraint

Like any idea, the concept of counterforce contains its own negation. Indeed, the counterforce advantage is realized when (and only when) it becomes possible to fully (or partially) destroy the weapons of the opponent while retaining a sufficient quantity of one's own. In practice this means that the victim's damage calculated, for example, in warheads, considerably exceeds the aggressor's costs, i.e. the effectiveness of a full-scale attack is extremely high. If the effectiveness is equal to 1 (exchange in a ratio of 1:1) the result will be parity at a lower level of arms. If the effectiveness is less than 1 the strike is self-disabling ("expenditures" are greater than "incomes"). In either case the strike seems to be an extremely doubtful undertaking, if one rules out the desire to unleash a nuclear war "just like that."

Generally speaking, high effectiveness of the attack in this formulation is not a necessary condition for waging it. The aggressor can achieve a victory without thinking about the losses if he initially has multifold superiority. But today (under conditions of arms limitation) such a situation is ruled out. Moreover, the negotiations that are being conducted show the desire of the sides to achieve parity both in terms of the overall number of warheads and in terms of individual kinds of arms. We shall take this into consideration and estimate the effectiveness of the strike under these conditions. Then it can be considered successful (from the aggressor's standpoint) if the damage to the opponent exceeds the losses of the attacker.

How can a strike be self-disabling? In this case common sense and political wisdom will not be subjected to temptation from advocates of power methods since all illusions about victory in a nuclear conflict will be dispelled.⁷ We are speaking precisely about the first strike (and not about an exchange of strikes) in order to make the problem as difficult as possible and not engage in an analysis of unpredictable behavior of the victim. Wanting to get rid of uncertainty, we must change over to an analysis of the behavior of the potential aggressor, selecting him as the main object of investigation (he is ultimately the one who begins the attack). We shall consider a condition of effectiveness of less than 1 adequate for eliminating incentives for aggression and try to transform a situation of mutual

deterrence into a situation of mutual restraint. Indeed, if the aggressor's assessment of the victim's capabilities is a factor in deterrence, a no less sober assessment of his own impotence in the first strike will hardly drive him to begin the attack, that is, it is a factor in restraint. The action becomes pointless of the goal is known to be unattainable.

The degree of ambition in this formulation is no greater than in the postulates of both concepts with their indemonstrable "rules" of behavior of the victim. At the same time a positive solution to the problem (if we achieve it) will look fairly convincing. We shall not start to idealize the situation, and the only initial conditions will be the existence of already known factors: mutual mistrust of the two sides and the scientific and technical revolution—the ideological and technological generators of the arms race. The denial of either of these makes any solution illusory. Hence it follows that guidance systems, program support, general reliability, and other elements and characteristics of missiles will be improved in the future. Let us preliminarily consider the question of counterforce weapons since these are the key ones in the search for a constructive result.

The term "counterforce weapon" (PSO) frequently figures in discussions about strategic stability, development, and modernization of models of military equipment. But the fairly broad spectrum of offensive systems and their potential targets makes it impossible to concretize this concept and makes it difficult to evaluate the counterforce potential of the SOA unless one introduces a clear definition of what is usually meant by PSO. Limiting our task to a consideration of the ICBM and SLBM as means of attack, let us not in passing that the solution is facilitated by an analysis of actually one kind of weapon (in terms of the nature of the operational tasks and the method of carrying them out). Let us try to formalize the concept of the PSO within the framework of counterforce logic.

In principle a weapon can be considered counterforce if it makes it possible to destroy a target with a probability other than zero. To one degree or another all modern warheads have this ability depending on the parameters of the warhead itself (the overall reliability of the system, circular error probable, the capacity of the weapon) and the parameter of the target (degree of protection). In order to single out the actual counterforce systems or at least to rank numerous arsenals of the two sides according to this indicator, it is possible to assign several values, for example, to say that the warhead that destroys the target with a probability of 0.9 is a counterforce warhead.

But this approach offers a solution to the problem only at first glance. In the first place the arbitrariness of the formulation is obvious (why 0.9 and not 0.8 and in general how does one substantiate the threshold value of the criterion?). In the second place it does not reveal the essence of the concept of PSO itself, presuming as it does the possibility of disabling the enemy by conducting a highly effective attack. Let us consider a simple example. Side A has 10 rockets with one warhead (single-warhead

carrier) and each warhead destroys a target with a probability of 0.5. Side B has one rocket with 10 warheads and each warhead destroys the target with a probability of 0.9. Thus the initial forces of the sides are equal in terms of the numbers of warheads but the "quality" of the warheads of side B is almost twice as great. With an attack of side A (A [attacks] B) it is expected that one single-warhead rocket destroys five of the enemy's warheads and the aggressor achieves almost double superiority in terms of the number of warheads (9:5). In the reverse situation (B [attacks] A) with complete expenditure of the means of the aggressor it is expected that the victim retains one warhead. As we can see, in the former case (A [attacks] B) the aggressor achieves a significant total superiority and in the latter (B [attacks] A) the strike is self-disabling. In other words, the results of the strikes are directly opposed to the quality of the weapons, that is the probability of destruction.

How does one evaluate the opposition of these numerically equal forces? Within the framework of the counterforce logic the situation on the whole is considered extremely unstable, being a typical illustration of "unilateral deterrence".⁸ Side A has clear superiority in spite of the poor quality of his weapons.

This example clearly shows that a high probability of destruction does not serve as a guarantee of a successful attack or an adequate indicator for evaluating the PSO. It seems necessary to include in the consideration the "size" of the target—the number of warheads contained in it, i.e. to evaluate the actual (calculated) results of the attack. To destroy the target even with a small probability can be either advantageous or not depending on the number of warheads it has. The planning of the attack should take this factor into account, especially with the initial variant for otherwise, as in the example that was considered, the strike can become self-disabling. Let us recall that the number of warheads is one of the most important indicators when comparing the SOA of the sides and therefore it is correct to use it in evaluating interactions.

One can conclude that the concept of the PSO can be defined by the quantity of destroyed warheads per one used in attack, that is, as the effectiveness of the warhead. If the effectiveness is more than 1 then the warhead (or weapon with such a warhead) and a counterforce potential against a given target (targets). It is obvious that the effectiveness of the large-scale attack we introduced previously is the total characteristic of the single strikes, that is, the effectiveness of the attacks of individual warheads on individual targets.

In this respect the concept of the PSO fully corresponds to the counterforce logic and reflects the real capabilities of the weapons systems and their influence on the stability of the situation as a whole. Indeed, the motives for the attack are determined by the capacity to destroy the maximum number of the enemy's warheads with minimum expenditures of one's own. Within the framework of this formalization the parameters of the attacking warhead are linked to the "size" of the target. The "larger" the target, the more advantageous it is to destroy it. Hence it follows that by

decreasing the "size" of the target it is possible to reduce the counterforce potential of the attack, making it ineffective.

If one does not subsequently depart from this logic, it is possible to come to this conclusion: The counterforce strike loses its initial status (as a method of achieving an advantage in the alignment of forces) if the attacked target is a single-warhead carrier. Taking into account the fact that under real conditions the probability of destruction is always less than 1, a strike on these carriers will always be self-disabling: The expenditures of the attacking warheads are always greater than the number destroyed. And this result does not depend on the parameters of the attacking weapons. This conclusion completely agrees with the variants of deep cuts in SOA given, for example, in the works of Soviet and foreign investigators.⁹

Let us now imagine a standoff of strategic forces that include only single-warhead rockets. With these compositions the counterforce strike is self-disabling (the "expenditure" is greater than the "gain"), which precludes incentives for attack if one uses common sense. There is some point to a strike on cities but only if this means mutual destruction. Thus the principle of "to defeat or to exist" proclaimed by the concept of retaliation is in its final form, having acquired for the aggressor all the indicators of the only possible outcome of attempts to destroy the victim.

Monitoring single-warhead carriers with stationary basing does not present any difficulties for satellite photographic reconnaissance either in terms of the number or in terms of the type of rockets. The number of warheads on the carrier can be determined according to its size characteristics when it is placed in the silo. It is expedient to augment this kind of monitoring with coordinated methods of selective visual inspection including going into the peculiarities of the technology and the functioning of various systems. Let us add that problems of protection for the destructive factors of the nuclear explosion (shock wave, seismic load, electromagnetic impulse) are also less than with the protection of heavy carriers, which increases the viability of single-warheads in the event of attack.

Including mobile ICBM's in the SOA complicates the task of the aggressor to an even greater degree, although monitoring these systems with satellite means is very complicated. It can be made easier by coordination of the zones of their concentration and selective monitoring on demand in conjunction with various means of marking launchers and monitoring plant production. ICBM's are most vulnerable at the points of deployment, which makes them good objects for sudden attack. The simplest solution in this case will be to increase the number of these points and the number of rockets moved among them, that is, to coordinate the minimum number of rockets that are permanently in the places of deployment.

In principle one can consider changing over to submarine rocket launchers with a limited number of SLBM's (or warheads). Here the task is the same: to reduce the vulnerability of the SSBN's, making them a disadvantageous object of attack. A submarine rocket carrier which

has a large number of warheads will be an increasingly deceptive goal as the oceans become more "transparent" to means of antisubmarine defense if antisubmarine activity is not restricted on a mutual basis.¹⁰

How does the SOA program look on this plane with its "noble" supertask of neutralizing the offensive potentials of the SOA? Obviously, in principle a solution can be found by a more earthly means—changing over to single-warhead carriers. If attack is unfeasible, why is defense needed? Is there any need to increase the protection of a bank with costly systems if the robber knows that the loot will not be enough to pay for the taxi that brought him to the place of the robbery?

If space defense looks unnecessary with these compositions of SOA, doing it unilaterally, on the contrary, sharply dramatizes the situation. A single owner of a large-scale PRO [anti-aircraft defense] whose "absorption" capacity approaches 100 percent becomes not only the full master of the situation but also the actual disciple of the barbarian tactic of applying the SOA—a strike on cities. Indeed, as soon as the counterforce strike loses its meaning ("expenditures" are greater than "gains"), the countervalue strike becomes an "expedient" action with respect to the opponent, the more so since there will be no fear of retaliation. And the "expediency" will increase as the PRO and the possibilities of interception expand.

There can also be intermediate variants, for example, a limited (albeit ineffective) strike on forces (to reduce the load on the PRO itself) in combination with a limited countervalue strike, and so forth. The essence of the matter does not change: Being in a certain sense "ideological" antagonists (single-warheads negate the need for PRO), in combination these systems produce a negative result—they dictate the countervalue action as a fully justified variant of the application of SOA. And if the concept of counterforce has allowed a departure from this interaction, now it is returning to its former place.

In a situation where both sides have PRO with a limited absorbing capacity the arms race continues after an increase of this quality, and the one that wins the arms race becomes the monopolist of the countervalue strike. And if previously this strike (extreme action of the victim) was a factor in deterrence, it now becomes an "expedient" action of the aggressor. It is also natural to presuppose the development of the most diverse measures to counteract the PRO. The result might be an uncontrolled arms race and rejection of contractual bans on the quantity and quality of weapons, and growth of mutual suspicion. A direct result of this lack of control will be a disturbance of strategic balance.

It seems that the proposals that have been made for neutralizing the offensive potentials of the SOA have justification for being presented against (by way of discussion) arguments of the SOA program or plans for arms modernization. In any case the technical feasibility of these proposals and the corresponding control measures cannot be compared (either in complexity or in value) with the developments of large-scale defense which with its

appearance actually transforms the strategic triad into a strategic quartet with a high counterforce potential.

Do single-warhead rockets guarantee a final solution to the problem? Unfortunately, we cannot answer in the affirmative since we have limited our discussion to attacks using only ICBM's and SLBM's. New kinds of arms, including larger-scale and less expensive ones, but with no less counterforce, will, as before, exert a destabilizing influence on the international situation. These include the already existing sea- and air-based winged rockets, bombers of the Stealth type, and so forth. Does it follow from this that the problem will again become unsolvable? One can assert with sufficient justification that such changes in the structures of strategic forces in combination with other measures for arms limitation will reduce mutual mistrust, which will make it possible to expand mutual control and limit or generally refrain from new types of weapons, the more so since it is always much easier to verify their existence (or absence) than to verify their quantity. In this case we are stating the obvious: Common sense and political wisdom are absolutely necessary for progress toward a stable peace. We shall hope that interest in survival (which in the nuclear age can only be mutual) will help to hold back the race in which, as in nuclear war, there should be no winner, recalling that its basis is our mutual destruction.

Footnotes

1. The total capacity of nuclear weapons, calculated by R. McNamara (secretary of defense under Kennedy and Johnson during 1961-1968), in single-megaton equivalents that would have to be delivered to the enemy target in order to cause unacceptable harm, i.e. to destroy from one-fifth to one-fourth of the population and half of the industrial potential. ed.
2. Arbatov, A.G., Vasilyev, A.A., and Kokoshin, A.A., "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability," SSHA-EPI, 1987, No 9, pp 5-6; No 10, p 22.
3. Kokoshin, A.A., "Reduction of Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability," SSHA-EPI, 1988, No 2, p 4.
4. SSHA-EPI, 1987, No 10, pp 17-20.
5. "Razoruzheniye i bezopasnost 1987" [Disarmament and Security 1987], Moscow, 1988, pp 290-296.
6. SSHA-EPI, 1987, No 10, p 24.
7. Kokoshin, A.A. and Kortunov, A.V., "Stability and Changes in International Relations," SSHA-EPI, 1987, No 7, p 9.
8. Legault, A. and Lindsey, G., "The Dynamics of the Nuclear Balance," Ithaca (N.Y.), 1974, pp 174-181.
9. Kokoshin, A.A., "Reduction of Nuclear Arms and Strategic Stability," SSHA-EPI, No 2, pp 9-10; May, M., Bing, G., Steinbruber, J., "Strategic Arms Reduction," Wash., 1988.
10. SSHA-EPI, 1988, No 2, p 6.

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DISCUSSIONS: THE LESSONS OF AFGHANISTAN

Further on Wisdom of Intervention in Afghanistan

Brezhnev-Era "Stagnation" Blamed

18030013a Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 89 pp 38-41

[Article by Vladimir Petrovich Lukin, doctor of historical sciences, deputy administration chief of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "The Lessons of Afghanistan. Sources of the 'Bloody Games'"]

[Text] The current "Afghan discussion" is not the first one. The phrase "in-camera decision" has already been coined and become widespread. There has already been discussion—including by participants in the current discussion—of the need for a public explanation from the currently thriving inhabitants of this very "chamber." But so far there has been no real in-depth analysis of our latest (but not only) national and international drama.

This analysis should proceed in depth and in breadth. In depth—into the specific nature of Afghan affairs and our understanding of this country, its history, its socrum, and its national character. For this is our neighbor and we are destined to live together, as they say, for centuries into the future. We must live together while allowing wounds to heal and creating anew the fabric of healthy, constructive relations.

In breadth—into our own ancient and recent history, our approach to world affairs, and the theory, practice, and ethics of foreign political activity. Without this we shall again and again be like the person who slipped and hit his head on the corner of a building, and instead of shoveling off the road, he begins to beat the corner wildly with his fists. For our real problem in 1979 was not Afghanistan (as in 1968 it was not Czechoslovakia) but us ourselves.

I should like to express a couple of preliminary considerations within the framework of this second aspect of the post-Afghan analysis.

In the discussion that has developed about the fundamental principles on which our country's foreign policy should be based during the period of perestroika important words have already been said and serious questions have been raised. We have emphasized the fundamental, decisive importance of global, general human problems as compared to problems that relate narrowly to countries and classes. Work is being done to clarify our foreign political priorities so that they will correspond to our country's basic choice—a choice in the direction of modernization, democratization, and the creation of a rule-of-law, civilized state.

But the discussion is far from finished. As in many affairs, in order to proceed forward energetically without stumbling at each step, it is necessary to develop a simple and clear understanding of the reality in which we are operating, of that which we wish to overcome and that which we wish to achieve. In other words, we must get rid of Baconian idols...

A fairly significant amount of time always passes between the end of a civil war—perhaps the most terrible, monstrous social cataclysm—and the erasure from the social consciousness of psychological stereotypes of the civil war. Until this happens the public vision is obscured by the bloody fog of the recent past, and this is reflected—sometimes in a decisive way—both in internal affairs and in foreign affairs.

It seems to me that nowhere in history has the fog of civil war been so prolonged, impenetrable, dense, and persistent as in our country. It was in this fog that such grandiose social mirages as the Stalinist variant of collectivization and mass eradication of the "enemies of the people" became a tragic reality.

For even such a concrete episode as the tragicomic and absurd anti-Pasternak campaign in connection with the publication of the novel "Dr. Zhivago" was also not least of all one of the gunshots of the civil war, one of the shots into the future, in pursuit of something and yet at random.

It is less obvious that much of that which was negative and tragic in our foreign political policy ripened in this same fog. We know what the Komintern formula of "class against class" led to and what a sad role the equation of social-democrats with "social-fascists" played in Hitler's coming to power in Germany in 1933. Indeed if democracy (including social democracy) and fascism are "representatives of the same class" then all of them are "white" and the line of demarcation is clear.

It would seem that World War II (for our country, the Great Patriotic War) could be a bitter, exceedingly costly, but well-learned lesson in overcoming class primitivism in our approach to world affairs. But a tendency to return at the outset of the Patriotic War to the stereotypes of the civil war made itself known. "We" or "they"—this primitive allegory was again brought into the light of day. Its application in international political practice led to a situation where we did not take advantage of all the possibilities of working against the creation confrontational bipolar world which is clearly divided into two "camps."

But, as they say, if you agree with destiny it leads you, if not it drags you. Even by the beginning of the sixties the world of "two camps" began to be transformed from a short-term reality in the largely unique postwar period into a more and more obvious utopia. In "their camp" appears the reality of De Gaulle's France, in "ours"—Yugoslavia, China, and Albania. The primitive class cliches superimposed on a complex foreign political reality that was animated by many factors on various planes are more and more obviously and definitely on the skids.

The Brezhnev period in this sense was the last attempt to combine the uncombinable. The need to dispel the fog of the civil war in international affairs was literally knocking at every door. The nuclear threat, the ecological catastrophe, and demographic stresses were apparent to each and every person. The world was becoming interdependent and interpenetrable.

Many people could see this. Not only Academician A.D. Sakharov, who recorded this vision in his famous treatise, but also certain people who stood close to the places where the most important foreign political decisions were being made. If this had not been the case there would not have been the Soviet-American meetings of 1972 and 1973 and the important decisions that accompanied them and there would not have been the final Helsinki Act of 1975.

But this was not yet a breakthrough—either intellectual or diplomatic. It was not because many people both “above” and “below” regarded the aforementioned actions as a deal, a partial armistice during the course of military actions between “us” and “them.” That it was this way and not any other was clearly shown by Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Africa in 1975-1978, and it was shown by the stubborn desire to preserve and condense the fog of confrontation and intolerance within the country, operating and, moreover, speculating on the image of the “enemy from outside.”

Let us try to resurrect the psychological atmosphere of the aforementioned “chamber” (I am speaking of psychology since I strongly doubt that during this period in this abode there was a predominance of rational logical analysis based on a study of the reality of one country or another, various options of possible actions, and so forth).

The first point of departure was apparently the division of the political situation in the neighboring country according to a simple but traditional principle: “ours” and “anti-ours.” Difficulties immediately arose with this for in practice in both camps everything was divided and multiplied to the point of making your head spin. In the camp of “ours” it was necessary to look for what was “absolutely ours” and to reduce the rest to the level of “not absolutely ours” and then even “absolutely not ours.” To everything else one could apply the principle of “anyone who is not with us is against us.”

The next psychological impetus was the discovery of “foreign military intervention.” This was not difficult since it actually did exist. But yet “we know” (by this phrase we have in mind a formula learned way back in adolescence—“foreign military intervention and civil war”), that “intervention is primary and civil war is secondary” and that were it not for this “primary” premise the people would follow “ours.”

Further. According to this same schema, what happens in Afghanistan is an episode, one of the battlefields of world socialism, led and embodied by the USSR, and world imperialism, led and embodied by the United States. If on this battlefield we do not “beat the Americans at their game” they, in turn, will “beat the Soviets at ours” and the

global situation will change to our disadvantage. Against this background discussions of secret intrigues to install nuclear missiles directed against Moscow in Afghanistan seem to me to be an argument that is quite psychologically suitable for use in the process of this kind of in-camera decision.

In principle in the situation that developed in 1979 one could conceive of a whole range of positive influence on the course of events. But by this time our country had already been put in a position where this range practically consisted of two notes. For by this period the effectiveness of our diplomatic influence on our partners was severely undermined as a result of the crisis of confidence that had been growing since the end of the sixties.

Our possibilities on the plane of what today is called “popular diplomacy” were so sharply narrowed not least of all because of the growth of negative, antidemocratic phenomena in the country’s internal and social policy.

Finally, economic levers were running out at a rapid rate.

Thus with respect to the Afghan situation as to many other world problems, we drove ourselves to the set of alternatives—inaction and passivity or the use of the military lever (all the more so since this lever was gradually becoming not only the only one but increasingly the most massive one).

During the course of the further unfolding of the Afghan drama it became quite obvious that the massive nature of the military lever was by no means equivalent to its effectiveness.

In essence, by introducing our armed contingent we were challenging the opponent to competition in technical escalation. It began with the use of our tanks and ended with the introduction of Stingers that were not ours... Anyone who did not “play through” this scenario in his head beforehand was a worthless professional—and this is the very least that can be said about this (these) unnamed persons.

But let us turn from military affairs to political ones. If we put together the two aforementioned circumstances—the psychological stereotypes of the most influential luminaries in secret government and the objectively existing (although they were quite subjectively created by these same people) narrowness of the selection of means of influence in this nonstandard foreign political situation, the lesser evil could only be the “natural” desire, dictated by gerontological motives, to go with the flow and “not rock the boat.” But this instinct did not always work—the complexes generated by the psychological stereotypes of civil war in their Stalinist, great-power interpretation from time to time drove the inhabitants of the private chambers to the decisions inherent in their viewpoint. Afghanistan, I repeat, was the last but not the only situation like this.

The authors of the article “Bloody Games” write that “this military operation was the Kremlin’s desperate answer to the failure of their foreign political strategy.” I do not think that there was any strategy at all. Afghanistan was our

payment for our stagnation. Stagnation of thought in some, stagnation of will and courage in others, and social stagnation in everyone.

Now the fog of the psychological stereotypes of the civil war is beginning to disperse. And it is quite natural that this is taking place during the process of democratization of our society. Real democracy is incompatible with the atmosphere of civil war. Democracy is a method, a mechanism, the ability to avoid civil war. This is why on the foreign political plane only democracy is a means of preventing the actions generated by various kinds of paranoid allegories. It is typical that even in the United States, a country with such powerful democratic traditions, the paranoid allegory of the "anticommunist crusade" was accompanied by the appearance of such a clearly anti-democratic trend as McCarthyism.

It is now a vital necessity for us to disperse the fog of civil war once and for all. Only then will we be able when observing the world to look out the window instead of into the mirror and objectively evaluate where we stand and with whom we are dealing in the world at the end of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties both on this side of our borders and far away from us. It is necessary to get rid of the "image of the enemy," the image of the "eternal interventionist," but this is not enough. It is important to create the prerequisites for the introduction of the civilized partner. Only then will it be possible to count on the partnership of others. It is good that we have begun to move along this path.

It seems to me that for a certain amount of time our foreign political (and to a certain degree internal political) practice will be largely determined by the "post-Afghanistan syndrome." Actually it was already in effect in a number of episodes of the eighties. This period seems to me to be favorable for creating solid, insurmountable obstacles on the path to residual foreign political adventurism and irresponsibility.

In the first place, the principle of the rule-of-law state, along with everything else, presupposes that the question of any use of force by the state (especially outside its borders) can be decided only by the country's highest legislative organ (best of all by a majority of no less than two-thirds of the votes).

Second, we should take resolute practical measures or a radical change in the relationship between military and nonmilitary factors of our influence on world affairs.

Third, beginning with preschool age we must fight against militarization and rigid ideologization of the consciousness of our citizens. Our internationalism must be transformed from the siege type into a positive, humane, and humanitarian type.

Fourth, the country must know its antiheroes. This pertains both to stagnation on the whole and to one of its most severe and bloody instantiations—the Afghan epic.

In order to eradicate the "bloody games" we must get to their sources.

Popular Opposition to PDPA Ignored

18030013b Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 89 pp 41-43

[Article by Valentin Mikhaylovich Berezhkov, doctor of historical sciences, senior scientific associate-consultant of ISKAN: "Warning"]

[Text] Now that we are considering the Afghan problem from various viewpoints it is perhaps worthwhile to discuss one more episode that occurred not long before the adoption of the decision to send Soviet troops into Afghanistan. At that time I was working in the Soviet embassy in Washington as a representative of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences [ISKAN]. I maintained contact with the academic world of the United States, participated in scholarly conferences, symposiums, and seminars, and lectured in American research centers and universities.

At the end of the summer of 1979 after speaking to students at the University of Illinois I happened to have a luncheon date with a staff professor. Next to me was a middle-aged person of the eastern type. We introduced ourselves to one another. He said that he was an Afghani who had been educated in the United States and was now teaching international law. It was on that day that the press reported the murder in Kabul of the leader of the April revolution, Taraki. I was interested in what my new acquaintance thought about the events in Afghanistan.

"I am attentively keeping track of the situation in my homeland," he began. "I know all of the country's current leaders well. Taraki recently offered me the post of minister of justice but I refused. I do not think that most of the people are ready for the radical transformations proclaimed by the new Kabul leaders. It is not so easy to impose them on the Afghanis, who are still living under the tribal system. And now the situation is becoming even more complicated."

"What do you have in mind?"

"The fact that since the death of Taraki, who was a more moderate figure, with the advent of the extremist Amin, the resistance of the tribes is becoming stronger and there are serious trials in store for the country. Would you like me to predict what will happen next?"

"I am listening."

"Amin studied in the United States and headed the Afghan student organization here which, according to rumors, is financed by the Central Intelligence Agency. The failed Vietnam venture is being experienced very painfully here in the United States. This feeling was aggravated even more by the Watergate scandal and also the events in Iran. The Americans' national respect has been offended. The respect for the federal authorities is lower than ever before. All this cannot but bother the ruling elite here. They must distract the public from its sad reflections. I think that the events in Afghanistan will help to do this."

The person with whom I was speaking went on to say that, of course, he could not say that Amin would following anyone's orders. But in one way or another the situation in Afghanistan would work in favor of the United States.

"How?" I wanted to know.

"I am sure that Amin will begin to force transformations: a land reform, social measures, an antireligious campaign, a fight against entrepreneurship. This will evoke protests even from the advocates of the April revolution, not to mention the peasants who still consider the land of the landowners to be sacred and inviolable. There will also be increased dissatisfaction among the small merchants and clerical circles. Amin will declare his critics to be henchmen of the counterrevolutionaries. Repressive measures will become stronger and executions more frequent. And the national intelligentsia, which is small in numbers to begin with but is capable of controlling the country somehow, will be actually reduced to nothing. Amin will turn to Moscow requesting more advisers. The increase in their numbers will only increase dissatisfaction. For throughout our history our people have repeatedly proved that they will not tolerate foreign intervention, the more so from the "faithless," whom many in Afghanistan consider Soviet communists to be. There will be excesses and violence against your advisers and their families, and possibly even attempts on their lives. And then Amin will begin to bombard Moscow with requests for the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in order to protect the conquests of the April revolution. Evidently this request will ultimately be satisfied. Then the Soviet Union will have its own Vietnam for many years. For the Afghans will not put up with what they consider to be a foreign invasion just as they did not put up with the presence of British troops when they sabotaged the plans of the British colonizers. The bloody wound in Afghanistan plays into the hands of the ruling elite of the United States. This not only discredits Moscow but also distracts Americans from the Vietnam tragedy and America's other problems. That is my prediction. I would like for it not to come true but I am afraid that everything will happen in exactly this way..."

Of course I immediately rejected the analogy with Vietnam. For the leaders of the April revolution are conducting progressive reforms in Afghanistan. There the new is fighting against the old. The Kabul authorities want to turn the land over to those who are working it and they are striving to eliminate illiteracy, to organize modern medical service, to bring women into social life, to liberate them from the tyranny of men, and they want to develop the economy, in a word, they want Afghanistan to join modern civilization. And in Vietnam the Americans supported corrupt Saigon political intriguers who were fighting against the Vietnamese revolution and tried to turn Indochina in the direction of colonial dependency. The people did not support them and as a result the United States was defeated in Vietnam. But in Afghanistan, I explained, the situation was the direct opposite. We are supporting the beginnings of the new, which has risen up against that which is old and has outlived its time.

Indeed, at that time it seemed that the Afghan people would gratefully accept the transformations of the April revolution. And since we were helping the reformers we expected no less recognition. But the person with whom I was speaking listened to me with unconcealed skepticism; his eyes even seemed to betray a feeling of pity for me because of our illusions and deceptions. He knew: Everything that I had so eloquently laid before him was from the world of fantasy. He understood well the real situation in the homeland and the mentality of the masses of Afghans; he knew the world in which they live, which they consider unshakable and for whose preservation many are prepared to give their lives.

Upon returning to Washington I told "competent comrades" from our embassy about my discussion with the Afghan professor and his warning.

"Might it be worthwhile to send all this to Moscow in code?" I asked naively.

"What do you mean, how could we!" they answered me. "Amin was in Moscow recently and exchanged embraces with Leonid Ilich. Is now the time to come up with inappropriate hints about Amin's ties with the CIA? They simply will not understand us and will consider us politically immature. And in general, what good are these naive predictions? What does the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan have to do with this? Your professor is simply a provocateur..."

Recalling this episode, I cannot get rid of the thought of how alive our piety before the leadership is. The gloomy Stalinist times when nobody would even think about saying anything that would contradict the views of the "father of the people" are long past. Just before the war in the Soviet embassy in Berlin they were well aware of the imminent attack by Hitler's Germany on the USSR. They even had the exact date: during the night of 22 June 1941. But Ambassador Dekonozov understood: Direct information to the opposite would only embitter Stalin, who thought there would be no war in 1941. And the ambassador accompanied his reports with a note: It cannot be ruled out that this information was fed to us by German special services for purposes of provocation. At that time everyone knew that to cross Stalin meant to risk their necks. This danger did not exist in the Brezhnev era. It was possible to get off with a slight scare, being branded "politically immature," or at most risking one's career. But many still carried within them what had been beaten in over the decades: Report only what the management will like, do not contradict the leaders. After all, even in antiquity the runners who brought bad news were decapitated.

I shall not try to judge how the Afghan professor's warning would have affected the course of events if it had reached Moscow in time. This entire episode, in my view, is interesting because it elucidates surviving impulses and reflexes that are still very much alive in us.

"Biggest Failure" Since WW II

18030013c Moscow SSHA: *EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA* in Russian No 7, Jul 89 pp 44-49

[Article by Aleksandr Yevgenyevich Bovin, candidate of philosophical sciences, political observer for IZVESTIYA: "Experience in Self-Criticism"]

[Text] When evaluating the events in Afghanistan and drawing the lessons from the past decade in Soviet-Afghan relations we justifiably place military and political problems in the foreground (how the decision to send in the troops was reached, what motivated it; how objective the information coming to Moscow from Kabul was; how intelligent the strategy of war and the tactic of military operations were, and so forth and so on).

At the same time it would be useful, in my opinion, to subject to a critical analysis the propaganda support for the Soviet policy in Afghanistan and the arguments used to justify the entry of our troops. In this connection I should like to discuss the materials I know best and have felt most deeply, namely my own.

I greeted the decision to send a "limited contingent of Soviet troops" into Afghanistan without special enthusiasm but also without protest. On the whole I accepted the official legend. But still I was nagged by doubts... This is apparently why I never wrote anything about Afghanistan in IZVESTIYA.

It was impossible to remain silent abroad. And when I was attacked I was forced to defend myself and to defend our policy. My arguments were presented in Russian in the collection "The Beginning of the Eighties. Political Essays" (Moscow, 1984) and then ("with additions and refinements") in the booklet "Let Us Get Down to Issues..." (Moscow, 1985). An excerpt from the latter is offered for the readers' attention.

Let us pose the question this way: What is the struggle in Afghanistan over? What does the new regime want and what do the insurgents want?

...The new regime, which took over on 27 April 1978, has entered upon a firm course toward modernization of Afghanistan, a course toward breaking the country away from its barbarity, backwardness, and ignorance and placing it on the path of social progress and social justice.

And what do the opponents of this regime want?... Perhaps they are in favor of political pluralism and the charm of parliamentary democracy on the Western model? Perhaps they are trying to proclaim a new Habeas Corpus Act? It is ridiculous even to think about this. Their goal—and many of them are not ashamed to speak about this—is to return Afghanistan to former feudal and prefeudal times, to return the land to the landowners, to tear the books out of the hands of the peasants, and to place women back in bondage...

Last year the Western mass media were sobbing about the fate of the French journalist Jacques Abouchar who, along with bands of mercenaries, penetrated into the territory of

Afghanistan and was taken captive and brought before the Kabul court. What the Kabul government did not accuse him of! Well, J. Abouchar, who was far from having any kind of sympathy for communism, returned home. Let us hear his opinion of the mercenaries: "They are simply abnormal. There are always quarrels among the leaders and conflicts among the tribes. People from the largest resistance organization, who are financed and armed by Pakistan, are flaming fanatics and intriguers. Seeing them makes one's skin crawl." and J. Abouchar concludes: "If one had to choose between the Afghan Communists and the ayatollahs, the former would undoubtedly be better."

And nobody who thinks about the Afghan events can escape such a choice... Of course for the people who put Pinochet in power or placed the Iranian shah on the throne the choice is clear. They are in favor of counterrevolution and to hell with all human rights. There is nothing to discuss with such people. But still the majority are clearly against the Pinochets and the shahs. The majority of people are speaking seriously about human rights, democracy, and progress. And it is this majority that should stop and think. Politics is a tough thing. In the transitional stages of history, as a rule, it has no half tones. If you refuse to recognize the new government of Cambodia, regardless of how much you may curse Pol Pot, objectively, regardless of your intentions, your position helps Pol Pot. And it is exactly the same if you refuse to support the new government of Afghanistan, if you grumble about the Kabul "marionettes," in this concrete situation you are helping the religious fanatics and feudals. And no verbal stratagems can enable you to escape this choice.

All right. Let us say that. But what kind of revolution is it that must be supported not by sympathies but by troops? What kind of new regime is this, against which not only landowners but also peasants rise up weapons in hand?

Let us reason together. The drama of the Afghan revolution is inseparable from mass intervention from outside. I have in mind Pakistan's hypocritical, provocative policy. I have in mind the actions of the United States, China, and several Muslim states. Afghanistan cannot but need support in its struggle against such opponents, and it is getting it.

But that is not all. The drama of the Afghan revolution is linked to the country's extreme backwardness. Experience shows that under these conditions a changeover to new forms of life can be especially difficult, excruciating, and painful. And another thing—inherent in all revolutionaries in all ages is an impatience, a desire to realize the ideals of the revolution as quickly as possible and jump from the past into the future.

The changes which the revolution began to make and about which I spoke earlier are as necessary to Afghanistan as air. It is bad when there is not enough oxygen in the air and people gasp for breath. And if the proportion of oxygen is increased by a factor of 2 or 4? The psychologically understandable impatience, multiplied by a lack of

experience, led to a situation where the scope of the reform and the rates of its implementation clearly exceeded the limits of the possible...

It would be a mistake to try in a short period of time to eliminate a way of life that has developed over centuries, ignoring national-tribal and religious traditions. Nobody can be surprised by the fact that the feudals and the reactionary clergy were against the reforms. Their power and wealth were taken away from them and they resisted. But the problem is that the exaggerated leftist actions turned some of the workers away from the new regime and enabled the former aristocracy by frightening the people with "godless Marxism" to attract part of the peasantry.

The benighted, downtrodden, ignorant peasantry are in general difficult material for revolutionary restructuring. Is this not why the chouans took up arms against the French Revolution? Is this not why the peasant Carlists from Navarra fought for Franco? History has repeated itself in Afghanistan but, as always, on a new basis.

You are always speaking about revolution. But what kind of a revolution is it if it is not based on a movement of the masses? If it was "done" by a group of officers and intellectuals?

I cannot agree with this way of stating the question. In the first place there is not nor can there be a general formula that is a mandatory template for "making" a revolution. How many people were with Fidel Castro on Granma? 82. A handful. But they were not afraid to begin. And people followed them.

In the second place, although the crisis of the prerevolutionary regime did not become as acute in Afghanistan as it did, say, in Iran, the facts show that the grapes of wrath had ripened in Afghanistan as well. The dissatisfaction with the existing situation and the desire for change began to penetrate into broader and broader segments of the population. But, I repeat, there was no mass explosion of the type that occurred in Iran. What could the party, the political vanguard do? Sit passively on the shore of an immense sea of human deprivation and suffering? Wait until the political awareness of millions of people is finally awakened? No, they chose a different path—relying on the army, relying on the leading segments of society, they chose to take over political power and in the course of doing so, through the practice of transformations, draw the masses into the revolution. And if this did not happen immediately, this certainly does not mean that they should not take over power. This means that the power should be used more skillfully, flexibly, and cautiously.

But regardless of how great the difficulties were in establishing the new life, the Kabul government would manage to cope with them. But it was hampered. Internal reaction, as I have already emphasized, relied on active assistance and support from abroad. In essence there was an undeclared war against revolutionary Afghanistan which was not yet gained its strength. Under these conditions the Taraki government appealed to the Soviet government 14 times asking for direct military aid in Afghanistan. But in

Moscow at that time they did not consider the situation critical. Taraki was told: We will give you weapons, we will give you advisers, but you must mobilize internal forces and resources for fighting off the counterrevolutionaries.

Unfortunately, in the autumn of 1979 the situation had deteriorated sharply. The struggle within the political leadership, which had always been a negative factor in the Afghan revolution, led to the overthrow and then the assassination of Taraki. "Revolution eats its children"—this tragic truth, first expressed 200 years ago, is still timely even in our day.

...Amin's terrorist regime and his mass repressions against broad segments of the Afghan society (in the words of Babrak Karmal, from 1 to 1.5 million people were killed) drove the masses away from the revolution and created favorable conditions for the operations of the counterrevolutionaries and domestic and foreign reactionaries. At the same time the seven purges Amin carried out in the army undermined the combat capability of the armed forces. Emigrants were operating more and more actively and boldly. The revolution underwent a crisis. Amin maneuvered, on the one hand, assuring Moscow of his friendly feelings and asking for troops to be sent in and, on the other, trying to establish contacts with the rebels and provide himself with support from the Americans. It is difficult to say what this candidate for the Afghan Pol Pot was counting on. And this is not important now...

Another thing is important. The events forced the Soviet Union to make a choice: Either send in a limited contingent of troops or allow the Afghan revolution to be defeated. We chose the former. Of course this was not a simple decision. Of course, as one can easily guess, all the pluses and minuses were repeatedly weighed and evaluated. It was obvious to us that the victory of the counterrevolution, the victory of the religious fanatics and the embittered feudals thirsting for revenge would lead to such a bloody slaughter that the Chilean junta would pale by comparison. It was obvious to us that the victory of the counterrevolution would mean the beginning of a mass American military presence in our neighboring country, which is incompatible with the interests of the security of the Soviet Union. We understood that the decision to send in the troops, even if it rested on a solid legal basis, could not but evoke an outburst of psychological war against us. But we knew and felt that a great power could not give way under the burden of extraordinary decisions and extraordinary circumstances.

The Soviet troops went in to Afghanistan temporarily, with limited goals. The Soviet troops will leave as soon as the infiltration of counterrevolution is halted. But it is those who most loudly demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops who are doing everything possible to support the counterrevolutionaries and, consequently, prolong the presence of Soviet troops...

We did not start the fire of the national-democratic, antifeudal, anti-imperialist Afghan revolution. This was

done by the Afghanis themselves. But we do not want the blood of revolutionaries to be poured over this fire. Such is our position.

One can sympathize with the Afghan revolution. But one cannot recognize the armed intervention of one country in the affairs of another as normal. This goes against international law...

Before speaking about international law it would be useful to know what it is. International law does not prohibit one country from rendering military aid to another. Article 51 of the UN Charter envisions the inalienable right of each state "to individual or collective self-defense." Completely in keeping with the generally recognized norm of international law, article 4 of the Treaty on Friendship, Good-Neighbor Relations, and Cooperation Between the USSR and the DRA of 5 December 1978 says the following: by agreement between themselves the two states will "take the appropriate measures in order to provide for security, independence, and territorial integrity of the two sides." These were the measures that were taken.

At the same time there is also a nonlegal aspect of this problem. Nonintervention is a wonderful thing. But the principles are not applied in a vacuum. At one time in the thirties there was a committee for nonintervention in Spanish affairs. This nonintervention ended up in 4 decades of Franco's dictatorship. So should we applaud Leon Blum? And if the Cambodians, who were cold-bloodedly destroyed by maniacs drunk on power, turn to the Vietnamese for assistance, what should the Vietnamese do—respond with a lecture on nonintervention? No, history and politics are richer and broader than political schemes. There are situations in which nonintervention ends up in shame and treachery.

Some people will probably think: Well, go ahead and preach intervention and exporting of revolution. There are people who will think that no matter what I say. But for those who really want to figure it out and understand I shall add: No, we are against exporting revolution and against intervention. Every nation has the inalienable right to determine its destiny. We know from our own experience what interference is, what intervention is. We do not wish that on anybody.

And if people on the outside try to interfere with a nation which has begun a new life? If reactionary forces operating from abroad try to suppress the revolution? And if a nation which has become the victim of exported revolution asks its friends and allies for support and assistance? This is the problem we are discussing and with which politicians must deal when making extraordinary decisions in extraordinary circumstances.

This is why I wish to say again: There are situations where nonintervention ends up in shame and treachery. This is the situation that developed in Afghanistan. And when I hear the voice of protest; when people who consider themselves democrats, humanists, even revolutionaries, are bothered by Soviet "intervention," I tell them: Logic leaves no choice. If you are against Soviet military aid to

revolutionary Afghanistan this means that you are in favor of the victory of the counterrevolution. Either—or, there is no third option.

[End of excerpt]

Such was my understanding of the problem at the beginning of the eighties. "An extraordinary decision in extraordinary circumstances." Let me recall those circumstances. In the first place, the main forces undermining the Afghan revolution were operating from outside and threatening the security of the USSR. In the second place, the legitimate government of Afghanistan was appealing to Moscow to send troops into the country's territory.

Now it must be owned that both of the aforementioned "circumstances" were fabricated to a considerable degree.

In the first place, the deep roots, the sources of the antigovernment actions, were within the country; help from abroad did not play an appreciable role, especially in the first stages of the civil war; and the Americans did not intend to send in a "limited contingent." We came to help the government cope with armed insurgents and we were forced to fight with the peasantry and the people.

In the second place, the thesis of the "request of the legitimate government" is up in the air. The data I have gathered and the testimony from participants in the events show that we began to fulfill our "international duty" with the destruction of the head of the legitimate government (the storming of Amin's palace in the evening of 27 December 1979). Therefore it is immoral to refer to the request of this government. And the request from the Karmal government was made after the fact and has no legal force.

The essential difference between "the first place" and "the second place" is obvious.

The clarification of the factual side of the matter (the causes and character of the antigovernment actions) depended on the quality of information coming from Kabul. Most likely it was not objective and it deceived us. Incidentally, the dependency could also be different: The information was whatever its basic consumers wanted it to be.

As concerns the "request of the legitimate government," the Soviet leadership was aware of what was happening from the very beginning. And therefore a reference to this "request" can be seen as an attempt to deceive world and Soviet public opinion.

Protecting and defending the policy of my country and of my party, I drove away all doubts and tried to find convincing evidence in favor of the decision that was made. Consequently, if one is to speak about lessons, it is necessary to take a more critical attitude toward official announcements. And when they contradict one's own convictions, one's conscience, then if it is impossible to present one's own viewpoint it is better to remain silent. Although this is sometimes difficult...

And now we shall move on from concrete circumstances to principles. Theoretically Marxism has always rejected the export of revolution. F. Engels asserted decisively that one must not impose "happiness" on other nations. Theoretically we have always defended the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of other nations. But practice has not always coincided with theory and policy has not always followed principles.

Remember: "Give us Warsaw! Give us Berlin!" The romance of the world revolution.

And the Soviet pilots in the sky over China?

Both then and during the first postwar years internationalism was regarded—along with peaceful coexistence—as a fundamental principle of Soviet foreign policy. Our understanding of internationalism and international duty included the need to help our "brothers in class" and revolutionary and national liberation movements.

Yes, we are against exporting revolution, but if a revolution has occurred, if it is struggling, if it is being hampered from outside, and it requests support, then one must help the revolution. In this context military aid offered for protection from the export of counterrevolution was not regarded as illegal intervention in internal affairs.

When asserting that there are situations in which nonintervention ends up in shame and treachery I was proceeding from the traditional understanding of internationalism. My education and my entire way of thinking make it impossible for me even today to take a position of absolute and unconditional "nonintervention." Possibly this is what kept me from understanding in time that the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan was a mistake in principle and perhaps the largest failure of our foreign policy in postwar years.

Afghanistan forces us to return again and again to an interpretation of such examples of "internationalism" as Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). A discussion of the past is still forthcoming. With respect to the future we must resolutely eliminate any possibility of using Soviet troops for "imposing order" outside our borders.

The new political thinking, as we know, relies in principle on freedom of choice, which each nation must have. How does one combine this principle with the "class" principle of internationalism? Do they preclude one another or augment one another? I have no ready answer to these questions, which were raised particularly by the events in Afghanistan. Apparently it will be necessary to reinterpret, to reevaluate the theoretical arguments pertaining to our understanding of the world revolutionary process, the communist movement, and the situation in the Third World. In any case, any variant of an answer entails overcoming theoretical and political difficulties.

Political, Military Lessons of Intervention

18030013d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 7, Jul 89 pp 49-53

[Article by Viktor Aleksandrovich Kremenyuk, doctor of historical sciences, ISKAN sector chief: "Bitter Experience—Serious Conclusions"]

[Text] The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan as a result of the Geneva agreements, while the conflict in the country continues and will apparently last for some time to come, completes a certain stage both in Afghan history and in world politics. What stage this is and which one will follow still have to be determined, but still there arises the question of which lessons we can draw from this story: lessons for us, for Afghans, for other countries, and for the entire world community. It is impossible to do without this, without an attempt to think and honestly figure out what all of us have learned from the events in Afghanistan and those surrounding it. We must try to understand, on the basis of bitter experience, what can and cannot be done in the modern world and apply the conclusions we have reached to the principles that comprise the new political thinking.

The new political thinking is not dogma and it is not another propaganda campaign. It is the result of interpretation of the reality of the rapidly changing world and its laws, difficulties, and contradictions. It is an attempt to find a common denominator for the interests of our country and all the rest of the world, which consists primarily in protecting human values, among which life, liberty, and human worth come to the fore. The lessons of Afghanistan, which has become a symbol for the usurped bureaucratic approach to solving complex problems of conflict, can and should help overcome the "everything-is-allowed syndrome" in determining the means and methods of implementing the foreign policy, especially the kind of all-permissiveness which subsequently ends up in the death of thousands of our compatriots and Afghans without the slightest increase in national security but with large expenditures of a moral-political nature.

The lessons of Afghanistan are numerous and diverse. Work on their interpretation has begun abroad, in friendly and unfriendly circles. There is an entire spectrum of conclusions which sound approximately like this: "The Soviets cannot be trusted," "The Soviets take advantage of any opportunity to apply military force," "Afghanistan is evidence of the real content of Soviet foreign policy," and so forth. There are also others: "Afghanistan was a tragic mistake," it is an indicator of the "antidemocratic nature of the entire foreign political process and especially the decisionmaking process," and also: "Afghanistan should teach all of us certain rules of behavior in the international arena and above all the fact that these rules must be observed."

One can set forth a number of other conclusions drawn by specialists and political figures in other countries. But it is important for us to determine which lessons we have

assimilated and can assimilate to to the benefit of our own foreign policy as well as in order to make them common property.

There are purely military lessons of Afghanistan and in all probability Soviet military specialists are working on them. In any case I should like to think that. The sacrifices made on the battlefield cannot and should not be meaningless. One must hope that our military men will be able to figure out the causes of the large losses and the high level of illness, not to mention the moral and material costs and many other unattractive sides of how we waged the war. Questions of civilized behavior on the part of the military leadership during period of war and peace should be no less important lessons. Elucidation of the events in the press, the notification of relatives of what has happened to their loved ones, support for soldiers returning home, the fate of disabled persons, the responsibility for the losses and for various orders—all this cannot and should not remain the subject of departmental scrutiny alone. The Soviet and foreign public must know the truth about how this happened and how all this is evaluated by the military leaders and specialists themselves.

There are also lessons on a sociopolitical plane. Work for interpreting them is already in progress. Attempts have been made to return to an overestimation of the nature of the revolution in Afghanistan and the theory and practice of revolutionary transformations, especially their peculiarities under Afghan conditions. General questions are being raised concerning revolutionary transformations in backward societies, the role of the party, and its unity (or, conversely, lack thereof) in the development and implementation of the restructuring of the society. Questions of the support of the revolution by the broad democratic segments of the society and also fraternal parties.

The lessons of Afghanistan are essential for our country as well, for further democratization of our society. Questions of the application of military force abroad as an instrument of foreign policy, rendering military assistance to other countries, and questions of military-political commitments—all this requires fundamental study in the context of expansion of glasnost, the surmounting of departmental approaches, and the stronger control of legislative organs over the process of the development and adoption of foreign political and military-political decisions.

Finally, there is a category of lessons of an international nature. The new political thinking, continuing the restructuring of the entire system of international relations on the basis of equality, democracy, and respect for national sovereignty, cannot forget about the problem of Afghanistan and other analogous situations. Serious conclusions from the Afghanistan experience should do more than just show our ability to rectify our mistakes. On their basis it would be possible to suggest some constructive program of action to the rest of the world.

The following, apparently, are included among lessons of this kind.

The first lesson pertains to the question of whether or not a great power has the moral right to apply armed forces abroad for the sake of achieving its foreign political goals. The question, of course, is not simple. Taking into account the volume of foreign commitments at the present time, the existence of immense armed forces, and the real foreign political interests, each of the powers that are permanent members of the UN Security Council can name a multitude of situations in which the application of armed force, from their viewpoint, would be legitimate from both the moral and the international legal standpoints, and also from the standpoint of the protection of the interests of national security. All this is true. During postwar times the world has been witness to wars waged by the United States, Great Britain, France, and the PRC. The last evidence was in our times, the eighties—Grenada and Libya, The Falklands and Chad, and Vietnam where the great powers used their forces. For the Soviet Union this place was Afghanistan.

But yet the UN Security Council and especially its permanent members have the main responsibility for maintaining international peace and security (article 24) and this means first and foremost that they must refrain from the application of force in international relations, including legitimate defense of their own territory. Deviations from this principle, regardless of how noble the motives to explain it may be, cannot but lead to paralysis of the United Nations and to an undermining of international order and stability. If the great powers can call to order an aggressor who has overstepped the mark and diplomatically achieve a ceasefire in regional conflicts, who will stop them themselves if they use force far beyond their borders? The existence of the United Nations and the unity of actions of the great powers have always been regarded as a guarantee that there is a force in the world that is capable of saving it from another cataclysm. But when this force itself begins to disturb the order it has established, the hope of preservation of peace and stability disappears.

It is no accident that the Iran-Iraq war, which began in September 1980, i.e. after the Soviet troops had been sent into Afghanistan, continued for 8 long years in spite of all attempts on the part of the Security Council to achieve a ceasefire. And it is no accident that it did not manage to achieve a unity of actions of the great powers when there arose a real threat that this war would spread to the shipping zone in the Persian Gulf. Everything in the world is interconnected, and when the great powers allow themselves to apply military force abroad can one be surprised at the willingness to do the same thing on the part of all those for whom war is the only safety valve in solving domestic problems.

Moreover, unlike with other powers, the application of military force by the great powers, especially such militarily powerful ones as the USSR and the United States, always becomes a source of serious international crisis. The consequences of the application of force are quite different for great powers and those that are not great: When this is done by a great power there inevitably arises

a whole range of reactions from the world community, which complicates the entire international situation.

Thus the first lesson of Afghanistan might be the need to achieve a situation where no one of the great powers will apply its armed forces abroad under any circumstances. The great powers are permanent members of the UN Security Council and could reach an agreement among themselves or make unilateral commitments not to use armed forces outside their borders.

From the military standpoint this corresponds fully to the policy of changing over to a defensive strategy and the corresponding military doctrine. From the political standpoint such a commitment or principle would significantly reduce the threat of escalation of regional conflicts and, correspondingly, the danger of an acute international crisis. From the moral standpoint this would correspond to the commitments of the permanent members of the UN Security Council to bear full responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and, above all, to avoid the application of force themselves in order to solve foreign political problems.

This conclusion, it would seem, contradicts certain ideas of F. Roosevelt regarding the "police role" of the great powers in maintaining peace and security. As we know, this concept of the United Nations envisioned active use of the armed forces of the permanent members of the UN Security Council in cases where there was a threat to international peace. But the postwar history of international relations has made its adjustments to these plans. The application of armed forces by the great powers abroad has most frequently been the underlying cause of the most acute international crises, which have threatened general security.

The great powers would have to agree on a voluntary basis to refrain from the use of their armed forces against third countries except for cases of defense and thus provide an example for other states. Taking into account the existing character and volume, the threat to the interests of the great powers from third countries would not be likely to seriously undermine their security but would have an extremely positive effect on the international situation. One can repeat after Ch. Aytmatov: "We must adopt a categorical law that prohibits sending troops outside the country for any reason, in response to any invitations or appeals, regardless of where they may come from."¹

The second lesson pertains on the whole to the problem of the application of armed force both in international relations and in the resolution of domestic problems. Afghanistan clearly showed that relying on a military solution to domestic conflicts is not justified either for the country's government or for the opposition. There appears a blind alley, a "bloody game," senseless sacrifices—but no political solution. For a long time in this area dogmas like this prevailed: "just wars," "revolution should be able to protect itself" (when they had in mind mainly the growth of military force and not the implementation of transformations which would provide for support of the revolution

by the majority of the population), and so forth. Undoubtedly correct for other times and circumstance, these dogmas have ceased to work in our time.

The situation in the international arena is such that in response to any force, including revolutionary, the opposing side immediately receives help from the countries that sympathize with it and there is the beginning of a bloody slaughter that lasts for years. Military victories of revolutionary forces are increasingly rare: During the past decade this has happened only in Nicaragua. In all other cases a fratricidal war has dragged on for years or even decades (El Salvador) or a political solution has been reached through negotiations (Namibia).

Moreover, the practice that is developing on the basis of encouragement of "legitimate" armed force (aid to liberated countries in the creation of armed forces, assistance to opposition movements as, for example, in the "Reagan doctrine") leads to acceleration of the arms race in the liberated countries and the creation of a military establishment for which the application of force becomes the only means of self-expression. There have been many cases in which aggressive wars have been waged with American or West European arms. But there have also been cases when Soviet arms have been used for the same purposes.

The experience in Afghanistan and the experience in regulating other regional conflicts shows that it is much more effective to solve problems of disputes through negotiations when it comes to conflicts between individual states or with a policy of national conciliation when we are dealing with internal conflicts. This experience seems to suggest that one of the main lessons of Afghanistan for our foreign policy, and for other powers as well, should be a firm decision to completely revise the role of armed force in resolving disputes and to consider the need to take advantage of all possibilities, above all the changing international climate, to eliminate the use of arms for political purposes.

The third lesson is closely linked to the two preceding ones and has to do with the question of international consultation. It is quite obvious that we shall manage neither to curtail the military participation of the great powers in regional conflict nor to curtail arms deliveries to those zones unless we create a system of intensive consultations among the great powers.

As the experience of the past 2-3 years shows, such a system of consultations is being established between the USSR and the United States. With the help of these we have managed to find a solution to the Afghanistan problem, to achieve positive strides in the situation in southeast Africa, and to find common and coinciding interests in questions of security of shipping in the Persian Gulf zone. The dialog between the USSR and the United States in these questions is developing with difficulty but there are signs of success and one can expect that in the future it will develop into an extremely influential factor in the peaceful regulation of conflicts.

But there are also other great powers and large states that are interested in having one or another degree of presence in individual regions of the world. They include Japan, which is showing an interest in the situation on the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf where it acquires some of its oil, the FRG, which also acquires raw material from developing countries, Canada, and Italy. Apparently the system of consultation can at least become a means of discussing the interests of the corresponding powers in order to coordinate them and, ideally, it could become an instrument for reaching significant agreements about "rules of behavior," including problems of delivering weapons, sending out military advisers, operating ocean fleets, and so forth. The purpose of such a mechanism for communications should be to resolve existing regional conflicts and prevent them in the future. The experience in Afghanistan also leads us to these ideas.

The fourth lesson is that, as the unilateral activity of the great powers decreases and the mechanism for consultation becomes stronger there will inevitably appear the question of a search for a multilateral organ which would be responsible for monitoring both the agreements that are reached and the situation in individual regions, including for the purpose of maintaining peace. We are undoubtedly speaking about the United Nations. Almost paralyzed by the long years of the Cold War and the critical confrontation in the international arena, this mechanism has not played a large enough role to become what it is supposed to be according to the UN Charter.

In the article by M.S. Gorbachev, "Reality and the Guarantee of a Safe World,"² the question of increasing the role of the United Nations in maintaining international peace, including UN operations, its mediation, good offices, and so forth is raised as one of the primary ones. At the time this article evoked a large response among the states that are members of this organization. And even stronger impression was made by M.S. Gorbachev's speech in the United Nations on 7 December 1988 when again and even more insistently he emphasized the need for all-around activation of this international organization in solving the urgent problems of the world community.

The experience in Afghanistan pertains directly to the problem of increasing the role of the United Nations since in this case it was the efforts of its secretary general (and also his deputy, D. Cordoves) that made it possible to carry out the complex and responsible cycle of Afghan-Pakistani negotiations in 1983-1988. It was UN observers who played and continue to play an important positive role in the events within and outside this country. Of course, as practice shows, the role of the observers still did not keep the Pakistani military from openly violating the conditions of the agreement or the United States from continuing its arms deliveries. But here one can see what over the years has developed into a kind of stereotype of neglect of world public opinion, and one can hardly expect that it will disappear in a year or two.

The lessons of Afghanistan have shown that power solutions to regional conflicts do not show promise. They have

shown that one cannot make decisions in camera, privately, when their implementation involves millions of people in our country and abroad, including tens and hundreds of thousands of people with weapons in hand. Let us hope that they have taught us once again the need to observe a unity of word and deed in both domestic and foreign policy. And the main thing we must learn is that the world, including such regions as Afghanistan, has come a long way forward in its development, and its difficult problems cannot be solved with arms, even if they are used by a great power.

Footnotes

1. PRAVDA 2 April 1989.

2. PRAVDA 17 September 1987.

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No 8, August 1989**Caution Urged on Using U.S. as Socio-Economic, Political Model**

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[Article by Yuriy Aleksandrovich Zamoshkin, doctor of philosophical sciences and chief scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Civilized Forms of Life: The American Experience"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] An extremely interesting article by E.Ya. Batalov¹ in the first issue of the journal this year began a discussion of the significance of the U.S. experience to us and of its applicability during our period of perestroika. I must say right away that I agree with all of the specific conclusions drawn in this article. The only thing that did not satisfy me completely was the use of the term "civilization" only with qualifying adjectives: bourgeois, Western, Soviet, etc. I understand why these adjectives were used to signify real differences in the process of civilization in the United States and Western Europe or in our country, but it seems to me that if we want to compare the development of these countries and judge the significance of their experience, we need a concept which would reflect the unity of world history as a process of the development of civilization and which would provide us with the grounds and criteria for a comparative evaluation of different forms of human life as civilized, uncivilized, or undercivilized forms. The term "human civilization" is precisely this kind of concept.

The development of human civilization has been a distinctly uneven process. Various countries at different points in their history might be involved or uninvolved in this process, or might even be partially involved in the sense that not all of the elements and facets of their life are

included. They can drop out of this process for some time, losing various previously acquired civilized features. Nevertheless, I would define all forms of human life as civilized if their development somewhere reveals a tendency toward increasing general applicability. The absence or abandonment of these forms will sooner or later cause a country to lose speed in its historical development, become stagnant, and suffer from painful internal conflicts, prolonged crises, and even social disasters.

Of course, the features of civilization have undergone evolution and renewal throughout human history. In this article I want to concentrate on just a few of the distinctive features of the **contemporary** stage of civilization.

It is probable that one of the main features is **human welfare or well-being** in a country, the prosperity of its population. It is clear that the sources of human comfort and prosperity vary: These sources might be wars, the plundering of other countries and peoples, and even the destruction of other forms of civilization. But if the main source of public comfort and prosperity is the productive and highly effective labor of the members of the society (I am certain that this is the mainstream of civilization), this labor is both a condition and a feature of civilization, just as the means and mechanisms securing a higher level of labor productivity and operational efficiency from the standpoint of world standards. Furthermore, this is not a matter of isolated outbursts of activity in a specific field, but of the steady augmentation of labor productivity and operational efficiency in all of the main spheres of social life. What is more, this is certainly a matter of activity producing a variety of items, products and services, to make life more comfortable and cleaner and to turn individuals into better people by bringing them happiness and satisfaction. And the more fully all of this is realized in the life of as many people as possible, and today this means the majority of members of society, the more reason there is to call this society civilized.

This is an important clarification because we know from our own sad experience that activity meeting the criteria of high productivity and efficiency sometimes does not lead to any real improvement in the quality of life of the majority of the members of society and does not make this life more civilized on the whole if this activity serves the fleeting interests of certain groups or bureaucratic agencies. There is also activity which is meaningless or, consequently, harmful from the standpoint of the development of civilization because it only squanders and depletes human and natural resources, destroys the living environment of people, and endangers their health and the very existence of the human race. After all, the development of civilization is an extremely contradictory process in which new problems and even threats constantly arise in addition to new possibilities.

When we speak of the main criteria of civilization, we can probably say that these are met by all of the forms of social organization that actually **enhance the value of human life** and provide more protection from the threat of the violent termination of life and from the brutal treatment of the individual, his body and soul, in general—forms offering

more protection to more people from the force of circumstances humiliating the individual, insulting his dignity and honor, and causing emotional trauma and mental illness.

In the present stage of mankind's development, **democracy** is becoming the main feature of civilization. The level of civilization in a particular society depends largely on the consistency with which the principles of democracy are implemented, on the ability of the members of the society to take part in making decisions affecting their future, on the degree to which the basic human rights and political freedoms are secured, and on the degree to which the construction and functioning of the law-governed state constitute a democratic process. The absence of a law-governed state today, in my opinion, would deprive any country of the grounds to call itself civilized.

Democracy is the method and condition—created by the lengthy process of the development of civilization—of dialogue, open and peaceful discussion, compromise, and the mutual clarification and limitation of conflicting interests, ambitions, behavior, and convictions of different subjects of the social process. In view of the fact that conflicts will always arise and that the danger of conflicts is a constant adjunct and product of history, it is precisely democracy that secures more civilized ways of surmounting or alleviating these conflicts: Ways permitting the avoidance of fighting and warfare, bloodshed, losses of human life, the destruction of the achievements of civilization, a return to savagery and barbarism, and social disasters.

In short, democracy is a product of the development of world civilization and a method of the civilized resolution of the conflicts representing an unavoidable part of the historical process. Democracy is **possible** because people—both as individuals and as members of a group, class, nationality, and state—can learn to be discerning and to reassess and adjust their ambitions, interests, motives, and convictions and keep them within reasonable bounds because of their awareness of objective historical reality and of the limits, problems, and prospects of their own existence and that of their society. Democracy is **possible** because people can perform selfless and noble acts and be guided by a love of mankind and by other common human values engendered by the development of civilization.

But democracy is **necessary** because people are not always able to do this in all cases. Sometimes there are historical limitations on their intelligence and sometimes they display irrationality, prejudice, subjectivism, egocentrism (individual, group, class, state, and national), emotional instability, and neurotic reactions to new problems and threats.

Division of Power

If we agree that the comforts of life and the well-being of most citizens, as well as the degree to which democratic rights and political liberties can be exercised, are indicators of the level of civilization in all countries,² regardless of the social system to which they belong, it is obvious that

we can learn something from the United States in this area. This is true in spite of the poor, the homeless, and the unemployed in the United States, in spite of the limited nature of existing forms of democracy or even the outright violation of various democratic procedures, which have been described in detail by Marxists and even by American leftwing radicals and liberals.

On the journey to more civilized forms of life, more democratic forms of law-governed states, and more effective economies, all countries, regardless of the social systems they represent, encounter serious difficulties and dangers. Some of these are the dangers of monopolism and bureaucratism, which can be present in the economy, in politics, and in ideology. There is no cure-all for these dangers, but there are ways and means of counteracting them that have already revealed their universal significance and efficacy.

In politics, for example, some of these mechanisms are free elections and the system of "checks and balances," to use the term so familiar to us from translations of English-language works. I agree completely with E.Ya. Batalov's concentration on the American experience in organizing and conducting political campaigns and elections, in making extensive use of public opinion polls, and in implementing the principle of "checks and balances."

I am certain that this principle, which has already been implemented in full in the U.S. political system, plays an important role in the general process of civilization with regard to the development of democratic forms of law-governed states. Independent institutions of power (legislative, executive, and judiciary) interact in such a way that mutual adjustments and limitations are possible. This can counteract the threats of monopolism and bureaucratism—for example, the danger of authoritarian dictatorship in cases in which a single political leader (even an officially elected one) or a single political group acquires a monopoly on power. The democratic organization of "checks and balances" can serve as a means of counteracting the threat of dictatorship by the ochlocracy (this term, dating back to the ancient world, can be interpreted as "mob rule")—i.e., any mass movement or mass emotion establishing monopolist control over the political process. The latter threat is connected with the emergence of a particular state of the public mind, in which expectations clearly diverge from reality and begin to take precedence over reality, and in which political realism and sober thinking, or mere common sense and reason, give way to prejudices, myths, utopian thinking, ideological fanaticism (in religious and in radically secularized or worldly forms), militant nationalism, or purely emotional and unconscious likes and dislikes or fears and frustrations.

The political reform in the United States in the middle of the 1970's, immediately following the Watergate crisis, is of particular interest to us. It was then that the Americans gained a keen awareness of the danger of the tendencies toward authoritarianism and bureaucratism in the central government and in the activities of the president and several federal institutions (the Pentagon, the CIA, the

FBI, and others). For good reason, the Americans began to regard the United States' involvement in the Vietnam venture as a result of the "work" of these tendencies. The same tendencies seriously impeded the termination of this venture. These and other circumstances dictated the stricter control—primarily congressional—of the actions of the president, the central government, and its institutions. The powers of Congress, its houses, and their committees and commissions were reinforced, especially with regard to decisions to send troops abroad, to offer military aid to other countries, and to conduct secret operations on the international level. Congress gained more authority over the military budget and the budgets of the special services: A sizable staff was created to take care of the necessary research and expert analyses. Laws secured the right of the media to obtain government information and public documents relating to the activity of central government institutions (Supreme Court decisions, for example). Important measures were taken to protect the rights of citizens in their dealings with the bureaucracy, including the special services (U.S. citizens were given the right to read any files these agencies were keeping on them). It is true that subsequent reversals expanded the rights of the special services, but the events of recent years (congressional cuts in defense budgets, the "Iran-contra" affair, and others) attest to the significance of the democratic reforms of the 1970's.

Free Enterprise

My knowledge of the state of affairs in the United States, Canada, and the West European countries and my experience living in my own country have convinced me that free individual or group enterprise, a free market, and free competition are essential prerequisites for the creation of more civilized forms of human life. They are effective and civilized mechanisms of economic development, although they are probably not the only ones, and they affect politics as well as the economy. After all, these are the mechanisms of the direct relationship between supply and demand, the free competition in supply, and the free creation and expression of demand. They are also mechanisms counteracting the dangers of monopolism and bureaucratism, and again in the economy, in politics, and in ideology (there are interesting examples of this in U.S. history).

Free enterprise, the free market, and competition are objectively strong and stable stimuli of spontaneous activity and initiative in all spheres of human endeavor, stimulating the development of personal awareness and a sense of personal responsibility for the well-being and the future of the individual himself and of the people closest to him. They give people a direct economic interest in a constant search for the means (technical, informational, organizational, financial, etc.) of augmenting the productivity of their labor and the effectiveness of their activity. Furthermore, they represent an objective system of economic compulsion [*"prinuda"*] (I have chosen to use this pithy term from Russian folk idiom) by creating a system of rewards for this search and—what seems even more important to me—a system of harsh penalties (bankruptcy and the loss of economic independence, well-being, status,

social position, prestige, and even self-respect) for a level of productivity and effectiveness either higher or lower than the level required by the domestic and world markets. Without this kind of compulsion, I cannot conceive of **continuous and spontaneous** economic growth, the constant renewal of tools and instruments, and the ability to quickly redirect resources and energy to conform to changes in science and technology, in public demand, and in the everyday life and thinking of people. I cannot conceive of a dynamic society without this.

We have shied away from talking about economic compulsion: Our high ideals would not let us. We did reconcile ourselves, however, to the existence of a different kind of compulsion: flagrant and outright brutality, elementary hunger, and authoritarian coercion. In my opinion, the economic compulsion created by a free market and competition is obviously preferable. It allows people much more freedom of choice and action. It establishes—and it does this objectively and impersonally, and not through the arbitrary whims of bosses or bureaucratic agencies—the degree of correspondence between the results of choices and actions and the person's well-being and his position in society.

Economic compulsion is closer to our high ideals than any other form of compulsion, if only because it promotes more productive and efficient labor and a wealthier society. On the other hand, an ineffective economy, chronic stagnation, unproductive expenditures of labor, a low standard of living for most people, chronic shortages of necessary goods and services, and the need to always stand in line—all of these have the most negative effect on the individual and the society. In other words, they are ultimately inconsistent with the ideals of humanism. It seems to me that economic compulsion will always, whatever the utopian humanists might say, be one of the conditions of the development of civilization. The price of this development might be high and it might be rising constantly, but the price of stagnation and underdevelopment is even higher.

In world literature, especially literature connected with Marxism, all of the existing and potential difficulties and drawbacks of free competition and the free market are thoroughly and soundly criticized, but we know very well that the elimination of all forms of free competition and the free market can also entail significant—and much more significant, I am certain—difficulties and drawbacks. Besides this, and I want to put special emphasis on this, the history of civilization already reveals considerable experience in alleviating the difficulties and drawbacks of free competition and free enterprise. Both the forms and the boundaries of free competition and free enterprise have undergone and are still undergoing significant changes.

The history of human civilization has been contradictory. One of its typical features is the cyclical exacerbation and relative resolution of conflicts between diverging requirements of civilization, the satisfaction of which is **equally necessary** for the development of civilization (this kind of conflict is sometimes called an antinomy in philosophy).

One of these is the conflict in which one side is represented by society's need for the efficient operation of mechanisms securing its **spontaneous self-development**, and these are free enterprise, a free market, and free competition. The second side is represented by the need for **purposeful actions, coordinated and regulated by a central agency**, and aimed at the resolution of the problems facing the society as an integral organism. These are problems which cannot be solved by the operation of the mechanisms of free enterprise, the free market, and free competition. These include problems in the organization of particularly extensive basic scientific research, many (but not all) ecological problems, problems in the development of culture, public health care, and education, etc. They include the problems connected with the social protection of people, the reduction of the difficulties and drawbacks of spontaneous market activity and competition or compensation for these losses, and the offer of social assistance to regions, groups, population strata, or individuals put in a disastrous situation by various circumstances. Finally, these problems also include the guarantee of social justice, the need for which has increased dramatically and irreversibly during this phase of civilization and no longer fits into the framework of the ideas which once came into being in direct response to the laws of free enterprise, the free market, and free competition.

During the course of the contradictory historical process in various countries, different needs have taken priority during different periods of history. In our country, secondary needs were assigned priority after 1917: Enterprise, the market, and competition were given some freedom to develop only during the period of the New Economic Policy, which did not last long. Later, after we had grown tired of the low level of labor productivity and the low standard of living and had faced the threat of chronic stagnation, we began a search—as yet a fairly timid one—for methods of freeing and stimulating enterprise, the market, and competition. It is in this area that we must stress the importance of the experience of the countries in which free enterprise, the free market, and free competition have received the fullest and most extensive development. One of these countries is the United States.

The experience of this country is also interesting because it was here that the active search for forms of government economic regulation and forms of social security and social assistance began in the 20th century. The problems which were discovered during this search and which became the subject of thorough discussion and the reason for many reforms and experiments are also of interest to us. The events of the last 15 years are particularly interesting and indicative in this context. After all, it was in the middle of the 1970's in the United States—when the development of the system of government regulation, social security, and social assistance had reached its peak—that the symptoms of a significant (for this country) decline in economic growth rates and labor productivity and of a rise in the rate of inflation became apparent. Furthermore, along with the processes typical of the American economy, much more common processes were also revealed, and I would dare to call the combination of these a **shift in civilization**. One of

the symptoms of this shift was the dramatic exacerbation of the energy, raw material, and natural resource crises, ecological problems, and problems connected with public health, which required much larger expenditures and much more intense effort from the society.

It is not surprising that the idea of the need for the much stricter conservation of all resources and the simultaneous intensification of production and business activity, acceleration of the retooling process, and enhancement of labor productivity became popular in the United States at that time. The appreciation of the economic mechanisms of free enterprise, the free market, and free competition increased accordingly. A search began for ways of freeing them of the administrative patronage of a bureaucratized government and the growing power of the monopolies, as well as ways of maximizing their activity.

By the middle of the 1980's, however, it became clear that this search did not presuppose a simple swing of the pendulum to redirect attention and efforts to the heightened freedom and activity of enterprise, the market, and competition, but wide-ranging experiments in the creation of new forms synthesizing free and active enterprise, market relations, and competition with vigorous activity by the government, but this time with the use of **economic** methods. This search and these experiments are still going on today and are providing us with what I would describe as valuable information with a general civilizing impact.

Individualism

The concept of antinomian requirements of civilization might also be applicable to an analysis of several elements of the strongest ideological tradition in the United States and elements of the national mentality. I, for example, believe it is possible to speak of the civilizing impact of the philosophical, ideological, psychological, and behavioral guidelines putting the emphasis on the individual's self-esteem, his freedom and autonomy, his right and genuine ability to decide his own future, his interests and activities, his personal responsibility for his and his family's future, social status, and well-being and, finally, his ability and right to openly display independence, initiative, and ingenuity.

As we know, this outlook has usually been defined as "individualism." We have grown accustomed to seeing it as a negative trait and associating it with the individual's hunger for wealth, money and capital, with egocentrism and egotism, and with a disregard or contempt for the interests of other people and the society as a whole. A look at the past and present life of the American people, however, also reveals completely different manifestations of this outlook. It was in the United States, for example, that the democratic variety of individualism received extensive and consistent development and has been manifested in the individual's defense of democratic principles and procedures and the struggle for the basic human rights and political freedoms. This facet of the philosophical guidelines and set of values in question turned out to be an important prerequisite for the development of democracy.

In combination with the acknowledgement of the value of labor, these guidelines produced enterprise and initiative and generated energy, creativity, persistence, boldness, and the willingness to experiment and take risks. Furthermore, people did not always associate their individual interests only with their personal well-being. These interests, success, and prestige were frequently associated with the determination to perform work of the highest quality, a sense of pride in doing something better than others and, finally, the individual's realization that his selfless and noble actions benefited the public and contributed to the development of his country or to human civilization as a whole.

The same set of values and philosophical, ideological, and psychological guidelines were a powerful reserve counteracting tendencies toward bureaucratism, authoritarianism, and monopolism, as well as the development of the statist variety of nationalism and militarism, which demands the complete and unthinking submission of the individual to the state, the army, or a particular political party.

The individualist outlook characteristic in the United States was and is customarily portrayed in our country as the direct opposite of collectivism. It is true that American history and current events reveal personality types and forms of behavior personifying this opposite set of values, but the same history and the same current realities confirm that the individual whose behavior is guided by the ideals of his own freedom and his own independence, who insists on the right to define his own interests and the means of realizing them, and who has a sense of responsibility for his own future and a sense of his own importance and dignity, is often much more capable of organizing collective actions. These include such forms of collective activity as the establishment of joint-stock companies, corporative associations, cooperatives, and other collective organizations and forms of democratically organized collective political action (participation in elections and the creation of blocs, alliances, and parties to conduct campaigns, to exert pressure on elected bodies, to participate in collective legislative bodies, etc.). The individual with these personality traits will readily initiate and participate in collective actions organized at the grass-roots level on a strictly voluntary basis and aimed at the realization of the specific interests and desires of the individual when these interests coincide with the interests of others.

Of course, the social purpose of the forms of collective activity created on this basis in U.S. history has differed widely because the interests of their initiators and participants, their ideological and political views, have been different or even contradictory (associations of manufacturers and labor unions, racist organizations and associations defending the rights of the colored population, organizations of supporters of the arms race and associations of peaceful forces, conservative unions and democratic civic initiative groups). It is indicative, however, that the level of order and internal discipline can sometimes be quite high in these associations, because their members include many people capable (and it is here that the tradition of individualism has played an important role) of vigorous

initiating action, the aims and forms of which they have freely chosen, and for whose success they feel personally responsible. In exactly the same way, the absence of sufficient numbers of these people could result in tendencies toward authoritarian and bureaucratic forms of collective action, which, despite the power of the mechanisms of command and coercion, are frequently distinguished by a low level of internal order and discipline and by the genuine passivity of their members, which is often concealed behind the semblance of activity. We can find the proof of this in our country.

I am certain that the history of civilization has already reached the point at which a society can develop more dynamically and resist the dangers of stagnation, crisis, bureaucratism, and authoritarianism more successfully only if two sets of **antinomian** needs are satisfied: on the one hand, the need for collectively organized mass action based on realistic assessments of the public interest and, on the other, the need for the energetic, ingenious, and enterprising kind of individual who is able to deal with the complex intricacies of social relationships by assuming responsibility and making independent decisions, using his own reasoning power as a guide.

Our Point of View

Analyzing the experience of other countries is an extremely difficult matter, and the biggest difficulty probably consists in the fact that the elements of the historical experience of particular countries which eventually acquire general significance from the standpoint of civilization are originally present in a form so different from the experience of other countries, that these countries tend to see only these differences. This was usually the situation in Soviet-American relations. Here an important role was played not only by the objective differences between the social, economic, and political systems in the United States and the USSR, but also by the **highly ideologized** nature of their relationship. The October Revolution advanced the slogans of communism, dictatorship by the proletariat, collectivism, and atheism and did not conceal its hostility toward capitalism, private ownership, bourgeois democracy (and democracy in the United States was viewed only as its personification) and, finally—and this was particularly important to the Americans—religion. People in the United States and the USSR acquired the habit of viewing their relations as a set of confrontations, without noticing that both countries were part of a single human civilization. The common belief was that the highest political priority of these countries consisted in proving to all mankind and to themselves that the systems they represented were superior. These interests were “at work” even when—and perhaps precisely when—the **objective aims** of social inquiries and experiments coincided in many respects and when the results of these inquiries and experiments could have been of mutual interest. I can cite several examples.

In the 1950's and the 1960's people in the United States were conducting extensive investigations of forms of government economic regulation, forms of centralized planning and stimulation of new fields of science and technology, forms of more equitably distributed government-funded social services (medical, educational, cultural, etc.), and forms of social assistance aimed primarily at the satisfaction of the needs and rights of the most underprivileged population strata. These inquiries were reflected most fully in the New Frontier and Great Society programs of J. Kennedy and L. Johnson.

Although these inquiries could have been of great interest to us, we saw them only as symptoms of the increasingly severe crisis of capitalism. Of course, we should recall that, in line with the traditions of confrontation, many influential ideologists and politicians in the United States saw the liberal reforms as a direct challenge to the realities of Marxist ideology and the socialism of that time.

Another example is the negative assessment in our country of the previously discussed measures that were taken in the United States during and after the Watergate crisis to develop democratic forms of law-governed public administration. We were preoccupied with the fact that Nixon, the president who had taken several steps to improve relations with the USSR, became the victim of this process. We tended to interpret Watergate simply as a conspiracy hatched by the opponents of detente, especially when they discredited Nixon in the eyes of the American public.

The most interesting example, however, is probably our interpretation of the growing strength and rapid political ascent of the conservatives at the end of the 1970's and in the first half of the 1980's. The clearly confrontational ideological wording of the conservatives' programs and reforms kept us from seeing the meaningful search they conducted for ways of counteracting the dangers our country was also facing. After all, in spite of all their differences, the reforms carried out by conservatives in the United States and in several European countries and the reforms we began to carry out later, beginning with perestroika, have elements of similarity. In both countries, despite the differences in the social views and actions stemming from the differences in political systems, there is a stronger emphasis on greater freedom from the government bureaucracy and on the stimulation of market activity, competition, individual and group enterprise, and commercial independence and initiative. In both countries there is a stronger emphasis on the intensification of the scientific and technical renovation of the economy and on a supply of new goods and services of better quality.

The **shift in civilization** (which has already been discussed) also led to the reconsideration of the excessively optimistic assumptions (they were characteristic of Marxists, the American liberals of the 1960's, and the European social democrats) that the constant and accelerated progress of science and technology should result in the equally constant and accelerated growth of social wealth—i.e., the “communal pie” feeding the entire society. The possibility

of the fuller and more equitable satisfaction of the rapidly rising expectations of all population strata, classes, and groups seemed to be guaranteed, because there would be an “outpouring” of social wealth and there would be “enough of everything for everyone.”

By the middle of the 1970's, however, the dialectics of contemporary civilization had already proved that these assumptions were too simple. There was the real **threat of decline** in labor productivity growth rates and, consequently, the growth rates of national wealth in industrially developed countries with different social systems. It turned out that the expenditures and efforts required for the acceleration of this growth were increasing much more quickly than expected. There was also the real danger that the rapidly rising demands, expectations, and requirements of all members and strata of the society could shift the emphasis from the intensification of efforts for the production of the “communal pie” to the intensification of efforts for its division and distribution, from competition between suppliers to the competition between demands and expectations. There were visible signs of the rapid “erosion” of social wealth—with consequences such as higher rates of inflation, chronic shortages, or a combination of the two. Finally, there was the distinct danger that primitive egalitarian and parasitical attitudes would grow stronger and that the mechanisms creating the motives and economic compulsion for higher labor productivity would lose strength. In the United States the conservatives were the first to recognize all of these dangers. They also initiated the search for ways of counteracting these threats. Many of the solutions they found won the support of the majority of voters in 1980.

Much has already been written in our country about the negative effects of the conservatives' cuts in social programs on the living conditions of several groups and strata of the population in the United States. We must also admit, however, that most Americans derived tangible benefits from some of the conservative initiatives. The rate of inflation declined dramatically, the scientific and technical renovation of the economy was stepped up, and the mechanisms stimulating labor and commercial energy, enterprise, initiative, and innovation began operating more efficiently. There were stronger feelings against wage-leveling, parasitism, and the lumpen mentality.

Incidentally, these values were more highly developed in the national mentality and ideological traditions of the United States than in many other countries. I am referring to the insistence on the individual's responsibility for his own and his family's well-being and social position (self-reliance) and the traditional American mistrust in wage-leveling and the idea of the “equality of results”—i.e., the idea of equal income, regardless of differences in the abilities and efforts of people and differences in the quality and productivity of their labor and commercial activity. I am referring to the traditional empathy in U.S. democratic thinking for the idea of “an equal start in life,” presupposing a struggle for more equal opportunities for all members of society—especially those growing up in families on the lowest levels of the social pyramid—to develop

and realize their individual talents and abilities, their industry, enterprise, and innovative initiative.

When we are assessing the years of pronounced conservative influence in the United States, I propose that we look at them from a new vantage point, proceeding from the knowledge that we ourselves experienced and are still experiencing the danger of the spread of excessively egalitarian and parasitical attitudes, imbalances in consumption and distribution, and the partial failure of the economic and psychological stimuli of energetic labor, enterprise, and initiative.

The most recent changes in the United States, however, probably warrant more consideration. Government allocations for social security and social assistance are displaying perceptible growth again. This is evidently the result of the still irreversible tendencies of the present phase of civilization, but much more attention is being paid now than before to, first of all, the economical use of funds, to derive maximum quality and effectiveness with minimum expenditures, and second, the minimization of the real possibility and danger of the growth of parasitism and "lumpenization." The antinomies of civilization are also apparent in these contradictory tendencies and efforts.

In view of the existence of these antinomies and the many facets of perestroika in our country, we can find something educative and interesting not only in the activities of the American conservatives, whose views have undergone serious changes, but also in the activities of the liberals of the 1980's and, of course, alternative currents of various types—especially all of the large groups in the United States whose views and actions do not fit into the liberal-conservative dichotomy.

For the ideologically vigilant reader who might think I am portraying the search now going on in the United States for solutions to various problems and contradictions of civilization in excessively rosy hues, I want to stress that this search is an extremely difficult undertaking because it is taking place in an atmosphere of intense struggle between various forces. The search is interesting to us not only because of its successes, but also because of the new and unresolved problems and the negative developments and tendencies it has revealed. The history of the United States has shown how difficult it is to establish civilized forms of life, but it also proves that tangible and substantial results can be attained in this process.

Footnotes

1. E.Ya. Batalov, "The American Experience and Our Perestroika," SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA, 1989, No 1.

2. I am deliberately avoiding the discussion of many other indicators of civilization, such as the ability of the members of a society to create works of art and literature of worldwide significance, to enrich their spiritual and intellectual culture, and to display high morals, especially since

the clear presence of these abilities in history has frequently been accompanied by a low standard of living for the broad popular masses and the absence of democratic institutions.

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Functioning of U.S. Congress Described

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[Article by Nikolay Anatolyevich Sakharov, candidate of historical sciences and senior scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Parliamentarian Practices of U.S. Congress"]

[Text] The need to elaborate our own parliamentary procedures with a view to the work of representative government bodies throughout the world is more urgent today than ever before. The experience of the First Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR proved that the underestimation of the importance of procedural, technical, and organizational matters can cause serious delays in the work, can waste the time and energy of participants to an impermissible degree, and can create conflicts whose severity could be reduced considerably by the existence of strong parliamentary traditions. In this context, it would be useful to take a look at the activities of the U.S. Congress, which has more than 200 years of experience in parliamentary practices.

How Bills Are Introduced

In the United States the most diverse political and social forces can effect the passage of a new law or the repeal or amendment of an old one. The administration is no exception to this rule. Its departments and agencies and the president himself have a strong interest in the passage of certain laws and send messages and proposals in support of them to the Congress. Another important rule, however, is also at work here: A bill must be introduced by a member (or more than one member) of Congress. Therefore, in the formal sense, the administration can only support a bill introduced by a senator or congressman (member of the House of Representatives) or by a group of them.

Each day the congressional schedule (which is approved at the beginning of the session) usually includes some time specifically set aside for the introduction of legislative proposals (or bills). The congressman introducing the bill briefly explains its contents and then gives a copy of the bill to the clerk (or secretary) of the House of Representatives. The bill can also be turned over to the clerk without any verbal explication. The clerk then registers the bill and sends it to the government printing office. The next morning the bill is entered on the House calendar with its registration number and the name of its author and becomes an official congressional document accessible to the public. The speaker of the House (the chairman) refers it to the appropriate committee, which will then decide its future.

There is a slightly different introduction procedure in the U.S. Senate. The senator sponsoring the bill must stand and wait until he is recognized by the presiding officer of the Senate (this function is performed by the vice president of the United States or by a senator elected to serve as president pro tempore in his absence). After the senator secures recognition from the presiding officer, he can make the statement that he wants to introduce a bill. Subsequent events follow the same procedure as in the House of Representatives: A copy of the bill is sent to the printing office, etc. It is significant that members of the Senate can introduce bills at any time, and not only during specially designated periods, but only if all of the senators without exception consent to this in response to a question from the chair—without a vote. This procedure is known as “unanimous consent” and is widely used in the parliamentary practices of the U.S. Congress.

How Debates Are Conducted

The legislator must stand and wait until he is recognized by the chair. In the House of Representatives the amount of time spent on debates has traditionally been divided equally among representatives of the majority and minority parties; this is not even disputed. Speeches are usually quite concise (a minute, 3 minutes, or 5 minutes); sometimes they can be longer (15 minutes or half an hour), but they never exceed an hour. The “unanimous consent” procedure is required for longer debates in the House. Debates on amendments are limited to 5 minutes, and once again extensions require “unanimous consent.”

By tradition, there is no time limit on Senate debates in accordance with the freedom of debate principle. It is true that debates can be subjected to time limits by invoking the “unanimous consent” procedure, but it is rarely used for this purpose. A group of senators opposing a bill can take advantage of this by resorting to the “filibuster” tactic: They take turns speaking, and no one can interrupt them or stop their uninterrupted group speech. The filibuster can last a long time, essentially as long as the senators want. A special procedure has been developed to “close debates” in order to interrupt filibusters and put bills to a vote. It requires 16 senators to sign the appropriate statement (or petition), which must be approved by three-fifths of the Senate, and it is difficult for either party to gain this kind of majority. The filibuster usually ends when the opposing sides reach a compromise. In other cases, the pending measure is simply withdrawn from consideration.

The rules of Congress envisage the right of each legislator to speak for 1 minute at the beginning of the session on any matter, not necessarily germane to the current agenda.

As for the rules governing legislative debate, the Constitution of the United States specifically says that a member of Congress will not be accountable to anyone for anything he says within the walls of the Capitol building. The constitution endows the member of Congress with the right of absolute freedom of speech. This is true only in theory, however, because there are at least two restricting factors in reality. The first is the restriction imposed by unwritten

parliamentary ethics, which will be discussed in detail below. The second is the fact that all new senators and congressmen have to take an oath of office on the first day of the new congressional session, promising to uphold and defend the Constitution of the United States. In this sense, the legislators are certainly fully accountable.

Confirmation and Removal of Public Officials

The head of the federal administration, the president, has the right to appoint his own assistants and the members of the sizable White House staff at his own discretion, without the consent of Congress. An important Senate prerogative, however, consists in the consideration and confirmation of presidentially appointed department secretaries and their deputies, the heads of executive agencies (including the CIA and FBI directors), members of the Supreme Court and other federal courts, tax inspectors, U.S. ambassadors, members of the board of the central U.S. bank—the Federal Reserve System—and several other public officials. During hearings in the appropriate Senate committees, the members of the committees can ask presidential appointees any questions whatsoever. After the committee discussion, the confirmation of the nominee is put to a vote in the Senate. Cases in which the presidential nominee is rejected by a majority vote in the Senate, and the White House has to nominate a new candidate, are not rare.

Besides this, there is a tradition in the highest legislative body known as “senatorial courtesy.” In essence, this means that if one of the senators should object to the appointment of a presidential nominee from the senator's own state, the other senators usually agree with their colleague. For this reason, the president prefers to learn the senators' opinion of the appointee in advance.

The Constitution grants the House of Representatives—and only the House—the right to exercise the power of impeachment; i.e., the institution of proceedings against a public official for the purpose of removing him from office. Any congressman can initiate the process. The impeachment of a high-level official requires a decision of the House Judiciary Committee and a two-thirds vote in both houses of Congress. In all, impeachment proceedings have been instituted more than 60 times in the U.S. Congress, against presidents, vice presidents, tax inspectors, federal judges, and one senator. Only 12 have come to trial before the Senate: Four (all judges) were convicted, and one (another judge) resigned before the Senate reached a verdict. President Nixon resigned during an even earlier stage of the impeachment process; he is the only chief executive to date to resign office because of legislative intervention.

Legislators and Political Groups

The overwhelming majority of members of Congress are elected to the nation's highest legislative body on the ticket and with the active support of the party machines of the two leading parties—Republican and Democratic. It is true that elections have sometimes been won by representatives of a few small parties active in individual states.

For example, candidates of the Farmer-Labor Party from the state of Minnesota have won Senate seats; in the 1970's one of the senators from the state of New York was a member of the Conservative Party; independent politicians have won Senate elections twice in U.S. history. As a rule, however, Congress is made up of Democrats and Republicans, and the two parties have their own party structures, headed by elected leaders, in the highest legislative body.

These party leaders (the majority and minority leaders and their two deputies or "whips") direct the work of their factions and naturally strive to secure the discipline and maximum unity of the members of their factions, especially during votes. They have no right, however, to obligate their colleagues to vote with the party leadership or, for instance, with the White House. The faction leaders can persuade, induce, and indulge faction members, offer them political advantages, and promise them influential positions on various congressional committees, but this exhausts the list of the pressures they can exert. As a result, the votes of the majority of Democrats do not always disagree with the Republican majority. The views of legislators within the parties, on the other hand, can diverge sharply. This means that the factor of party affiliation is certainly not the only determinant or the deciding factor in the political behavior of the members of Congress. Common group interests are equally important. Legislators can simultaneously belong to different factions (or caucuses) formed on a non-partisan basis.

At different times, for example, there have been congressional caucuses of black legislators, women, newcomers, Vietnam War veterans, legislators from the northeastern and midwestern states, legislators representing steel industry interests, and others. All of these factions defend specific interests and are made up of Republicans and Democrats.

There is no question that this multitude of factions with the most diverse interests and goals results in the substantial fragmentation of the legislative process. The American legislators usually take a bipartisan—i.e., common—approach, however, to cardinal issues of government policy. In this way, the presence of different factions in Congress reflects the objective pluralism of socioeconomic and political group interests in the American society but does not undermine the integration of all these interests in the mainstream of national policy.

Equality of Legislators

In the formal sense, all members of Congress participate equally in the legislative process, but a small elite group has existed for a long time and has been directing the actions of the rest of the Congress. Its power is based on seniority, in a system in which the congressional veterans who have been re-elected numerous times have advantages over recently elected members of Congress, revealed most distinctly in the distribution of the most influential seats on committees and nominations for congressional leaders. In recent decades the legislative rank and file has weakened the seniority system somewhat by insisting that the

chairmen of House committees should be elected by a secret ballot of the majority party faction. Even today, however, the leaders of Congress exercise real power: In particular, the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Representatives preside over sessions, decide many procedural questions, and recognize members wishing to speak.

Nevertheless, the presiding officers cannot arbitrarily refuse to recognize legislators wishing to speak or interrupt their speeches. Furthermore, parliamentary procedure envisages the right of any legislator, regardless of seniority, to protest a procedural decision of the presiding officer. If the protest is supported by a majority of the legislators present, the decision is annulled. In spite of this, however, it is an unwritten law of behavior for congressional newcomers who wish to secure the successful passage of their bills to always treat congressional leaders with respect.

Forms and Methods of Voting

Various polling and voting procedures are used in the highest legislative body in the United States. In the simplest of these, the presiding officer asks the legislators present: "Any objections?" If no one objects, the matter is settled without a vote, by means of the previously mentioned "unanimous consent" rule. A roll-call vote, faultlessly recorded by an electronic voting system installed in Congress in the 1970's, is used for all major bills and political appointments. By tradition, the legislators express their opinion by saying "Yea" or "Nay." Those who do not want to go on record for or against a measure simply acknowledge their presence when the vote is taken.

In some cases the presiding officer calls for a voice vote without recording the position of each legislator. This procedure is commonly used in Congress to learn the majority opinion. If one-fifth of the legislators present demand it, however, the presiding officer must call for a roll-call vote. The Constitution requires a record roll-call vote in only one case—when Congress overrides a presidential veto of a congressional bill.

The president of the Senate (vice president of the United States) and the speaker of the House usually do not vote. In the case of a tie, however, the matter is settled by the presiding officer's vote.

In the American Congress the secret ballot is used only in the elections of party faction leaders and committee chairmen. In all other cases, there is no secret ballot, and this, in combination with the frequent use of the record roll-call vote, allows the voters to keep track of the political views of their representatives.

The record roll-call vote in Congress gives political and public organizations a chance to rate legislators. The reputation of each legislator is based largely on his rating: He might be defined as a liberal, a conservative, a strict environmentalist, an ally of the business community, a labor union advocate, and so forth. The legislators usually keep track of these ratings, and this factor heightens their responsibility for the decisions they make and largely determines their chances for re-election.

Parliamentarians With More Than One Job

Legislative activity takes up much of the time of the members of Congress because of the length of the session. Each session usually begins on 3 January and lasts 2 years, with recesses for spring (Easter), summer, and Christmas vacations. Congress does not meet each day, but the legislators do meet around 300 days in the year. Nevertheless, some of them manage to combine their political activity with a legal practice and others are members of the board of banks and companies in their own states or head family firms. This combination of careers, however, is quite rare. For the overwhelming majority of congressmen and senators, their office is their profession and their vocation.

It is significant that the Constitution of the United States clearly and specifically prohibits the simultaneous holding of a position in the federal administration and the position of a senator or congressman. This constitutional prohibition stems from the fundamental principle of the separation of powers in the American political system and is specifically intended to keep the legislative branch independent of the executive branch.

Public Accessibility

The registration of the names of the authors of bills and the record roll-call vote, which soon become a matter of public record, constitute important elements of the openness of American parliamentary activity. Besides this, most of the sessions of both congressional houses are open to the public. The chambers are equipped with special galleries: separate galleries for the public and for the press. The House of Representatives was the first to agree to televised broadcasts of its proceedings in 1978, and the Senate followed its example in the 1980's. Anyone with cable television can watch these proceedings in his own home. In addition, he can also see some of the more dramatic committee meetings.

The sessions where military policy, for instance, is discussed are closed to the public. Some American political scientists believe that the American public does not know enough about many major congressional decisions made behind closed doors. Nevertheless, the level of public access to the work of the U.S. Congress is indisputably quite high. This is also attested to by the fact that stenographic records of congressional proceedings are published literally the next day in the official bulletin called the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. The record of committee and commission hearings is also published in full and often constitutes a whole series of volumes rather than just one volume. Furthermore, any legislator can hold a press conference to issue a statement. Finally, congressmen and senators frequently send letters and articles to leading newspapers to express their views, and the newspapers are usually eager to print them. The members of Congress do not, however, have any specifically stipulated rights to make statements on radio and television or in the press because all of the news media in the United States are privately owned, and the owners themselves decide what

they will put on the air or in print. It is understandable, however, that legislators are also of great interest to the American media.

Parliamentary Ethics and the Procedure of Removing and Replacing Legislators

The atmosphere of the democratic discussion of issues and the authority of Congress and its members demand that legislators treat each other with respect. Forms of address and styles of speech were decided long ago. For example, the member of Congress begins his speech by thanking the presiding officer for recognizing him. If he names other legislators, he refers to them with respect and does not forget to use their titles (Senator or Congressman so-and-so). Although debates are often heated and legislators take opposite sides, they usually remain polite and address one another as colleagues.

Standards of parliamentary behavior are not upheld by everyone. Some people lose their self-control and attack, insult, or accuse their colleagues. These actions are regarded as impermissible violations of parliamentary ethics and are disdained by the majority of legislators.

High political standards also presuppose respect for the right of each speaker to express his views freely during the time allotted to him. Such undemocratic behavior as "drowning out" the parliamentarian's speech or interrupting it does not exist in the American Congress. Shouting from the public gallery is not allowed when Congress is in session. If the presiding officer feels it is necessary, he can order the removal of anyone who violates the rules from the gallery.

Parliamentary ethics also presuppose the annual submission of a detailed financial report by each legislator. In recent decades these rules have been made stricter: The legislator now does not have the right to earn more than 26,000 dollars outside the Congress or to have business interests in the spheres of private enterprise connected with his legislative activity. Besides this, all sources of income must be listed in financial reports, including the value of real estate, stocks, speaking fees, and gifts from organizations and individuals. Special committees investigate matters of parliamentary ethics in the Senate and the House of Representatives.

Under the Constitution of the United States, each house may punish any of its members "for disorderly behavior" and expel a member from the chamber with a two-thirds vote. This is an extreme measure, however, and it is rarely used in Congress. Another form of punishment is the "censure" of a member of Congress by the decision of a majority of the legislators. This is also rarely used: In the last two centuries only around 30 congressmen and 10 senators have been censured by their colleagues. Censure is usually invoked in cases of financial abuses, corruption, and insulting verbal attacks on congressional colleagues and leaders. Censured legislators usually resign or are defeated in the next election.

Members of Congress do not have parliamentary immunity and can be tried for breaking the law on an equal

footing with all other citizens of the United States. Some have been convicted. Members of Congress are not recalled by voters in the United States. If a senator dies or resigns, the governor of his state appoints a temporary successor to fill the vacancy until the next election. In a similar case involving a congressman, a special election is held in his district.

Working Conditions of Legislators

All members of Congress are paid a salary from the federal budget. It is the same for the members of both houses. This salary rises constantly: It was 42,500 dollars in 1975, 57,500 in 1978, and 89,500 in 1989. The amount corresponds to the income of the upper strata of the so-called "middle class." We should add that around one-third of the senators in the present Congress are millionaires. There are also many legislators, however, whose salary is virtually their only source of income.

In addition, all members of Congress receive an allowance to cover job-related expenses such as staff maintenance costs, mailing costs, travel to and from their electoral districts, and the cost of office furniture and equipment. In most cases, this allowance does not cover all of these expenses and the legislator must cover the remainder out of his own pocket.

Legislators are also eligible for life insurance policies on preferential terms and have access to the congressional swimming pool, gym, and sauna. First-aid stations and all of the necessary medical divisions are located in the congressional buildings. Members of Congress have private dining rooms and cafeterias, a barber shop, a post office, and airline and railroad ticket offices. Some legislators rent homes in Washington and others stay in comfortable hotels when Congress is in session. Only congressional leaders have company cars. All other legislators drive their own automobiles, but they have special license plates and can park anywhere on the Capitol grounds. In short, measures are taken to save the legislators time and protect their health.

Each member of Congress has his own office, with a reception area and space for an administrative staff. A senator usually has a staff of 20 to 30 people; some remain in his district to stay in touch with his constituency, and others work in Washington. The personal staff of a legislator, headed by his administrative assistant, includes legal advisers, press liaisons, secretaries, and stenographers.

The staff drafts speeches and legislative proposals, processes correspondence, and analyzes the current political situation. Because legislators are simultaneously members of several committees and subcommittees, they frequently send assistants to attend these meetings and report to them on the proceedings. Without the help of a well-trained "team," the member of Congress would be unable to take part in the extremely complex and intense flow of contemporary legislation or even to respond in some way to the hundreds of bills and resolutions introduced in Congress each year. Computers in the legislators' offices give them

information about pending measures, and monitors allow them to keep track of debates on the floor.

Legislators also rely on the massive congressional information analysis system. The main "intellectual bank" in this system is the Library of Congress, established by congressional decision and with congressional funds in 1800 and now one of the largest libraries in the world. It is primarily intended to serve the legislators and the congressional staff, but it is also open to the public. Members of Congress and their assistants can request any kind of information. All of the legislative acts passed in the United States are also stored in here. One of the agencies of the library is the Congressional Research Service, a large scientific center drafting recommendations in various spheres of government policy.

Information analysis services also operate within Congress itself—the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Budget Office. These agencies work out all of the details of budget policy and assess the financial aspects of government programs. Besides this, each house has a legal consulting group. These highly qualified experts are directly involved in the drafting of bills.

Each Senate and House committee also has staffers with considerable legislative experience to assist the committee members.

Finally, there are 8,500 technical service personnel. The total number of congressional employees now exceeds 30,000, and government allocations for congressional activity have now reached 2 billion dollars a year.

These are the human, intellectual, and financial resources and expenditures mobilized to secure the functioning of the supreme legislative body in the United States.

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Nostalgia for the 'Soviet Threat'

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[Article by Yuriy Pavlovich Davydov, doctor of historical sciences, professor, and sector head at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "'Soviet Threat' Nostalgia"]

[Text] Although each Soviet-West German summit meeting is unique, they have a common feature. It was mentioned in an article in the American weekly NEWSWEEK by T. Sommer, the renowned political scientist and editor-in-chief of DIE ZEIT, a liberal magazine: "Each time the chancellor of the FRG goes to Moscow, nervous people in the Western capitals begin to tremble. Are the Germans getting ready to leave the Western alliance? Will their hope of reuniting the divided Germany take precedence over their postwar commitments to NATO and the EEC?"¹ Federal Chancellor H. Kohl's visit to Moscow in October 1988 was no exception, and neither was General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M.S. Gorbachev's visit to the FRG in June 1989.

There do not seem to be any special grounds for this kind of alarm. When the Reagan administration decided to establish a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union and signed the first treaty on nuclear disarmament with the USSR, it also legalized the normalization of East-West relations for its allies. President Bush has repeatedly expressed the wish that this process will continue. Bonn has always responded by underscoring its adherence to NATO and has demonstrated its loyalty to Washington in words and actions by informing it in detail of the content of talks with the Soviet leadership. The specter of Rapallo, however, is always looming over the American foreign policy establishment. To lay a historical foundation for his own doubts, H. Kissinger wrote: "We believe that West Germany's pro-Western orientation is natural, but if we look at German history, this country has never formed alliances with the West. Whenever it has had an ally, it has been the East."² American foreign policy-makers are always worried that dialogue between the FRG and the USSR will transcend the bounds of what Washington regards as ordinary East-West contacts in Europe and will thereby drive a wedge into Soviet-American relations and ruin the global game plan of U.S. ruling circles. Furthermore, because they have traditionally regarded the FRG as the basis of the "European pillar" of NATO and of European sociopolitical equilibrium, they see any possible West German deviation (or even the hint of one) from Washington's policy line as a threat to the stability of Atlantic structures.

Furthermore, aside from historical parallels, the possibility of this kind of deviation, in the opinion of many American researchers, has also increased considerably as a result of objective processes that have been taking shape for a long time in transatlantic relations. Above all, these include the more important role of Western Europe (and also of the FRG) in the world capitalist economy and in international relations and the growing scales and strength of integration processes within the EEC, which is still inferior to the United States in economic strength but is catching up with it in political influence in world affairs. This possibility, however, has recently been increased to an equal extent by the influence of the Soviet factor.

Four Decades of Fear

The Soviet factor has always played an important role in postwar American-West German relations. During the period of cold war, Washington eagerly made references to the "international communist conspiracy headed by Moscow" in order to attach Adenauer's FRG to its own policy of confrontation with the USSR and the other socialist countries for a long time. For more than 20 years American administrations persisted in convincing Bonn that only reliance on the strength of the United States would allow it to resist the leftist wave from the east and to eventually take over the GDR. The "new eastern policy" of Willy Brandt's government revealed completely different facets of the Soviet factor in American-West German relations: By normalizing relations with the Soviet Union, Poland, the CSSR, the GDR, and other socialist states, Bonn considerably enhanced its prestige in

Europe and in the system of international relations and strengthened its autonomy and independence on the political level, including relations with the United States, where the ruling clique was extremely upset by this move by its "most faithful ally." "Many critics in the United States alleged that Brandt's 'new eastern policy' was being developed at the expense of the FRG's Atlantic and West European ties," stressed D. Calleo from Johns Hopkins University.³ Chancellor Brandt had to go to Washington and assure R. Nixon and H. Kissinger that he had no "ulterior motives."

The incompetent Brezhnev leadership misjudged the opportunities Soviet foreign policy could have derived from detente in Europe, especially in relations with the FRG. By cutting detente off from its European roots and confining it to relations with the United States—and, what is more, by reserving it exclusively for ostentatious and unproductive summit meetings (1973 and 1974)—it diminished the scales of detente by making it a hostage of the internal political struggle in the United States. By gradually escalating tension and reviving the "enemy image" of the Soviet Union, Washington was able to regain its own influence in Western Europe (although to a lesser degree than in the past) and to involve Western Europe in a new round of confrontations with the USSR. The mass-scale deployment of Soviet SS-20 intermediate-range missiles aimed at Western Europe frightened its ruling circles and sent them running back into the arms of their senior partner. Just as during the years of cold war, the USSR unwittingly brought Bonn and Washington closer together with its policies.

Politico-military alliances are usually held together by an external threat (real or imaginary). NATO came into being and functioned as an alliance, and particularly as a military organization, on the basis of fear of the Soviet Union—of its military strength and its political system. International tension cancels out the natural differences in the interests of states belonging to a politico-military alliance. "For almost four decades it was precisely the fear of the Russians that held the Western alliance together," an editorial in DER SPIEGEL stressed.⁴ It was no coincidence that Washington tried to convince its allies of the "incredible insidiousness of the Russians" even during periods of "thaw" in Soviet-American relations.

The foundations of politico-military alliances begin to erode, however, as soon as the external danger begins to subside and as soon as the belief in this danger begins to disappear. In these cases the natural interests of alliance members—the interests not suppressed by the leader of the alliance—begin to determine their international behavior. This is true of NATO (and also of the Warsaw Pact) as a whole, and it is even more true of American-West German relations.

The situation here began changing again in the middle of the 1980's. In addition to other objective circumstances, perestroika, the process of democratization, and the development of glasnost in the Soviet Union began to influence these relations, as did the new Soviet foreign policy

thinking, presupposing the reassessment of many traditional categories and criteria of international relations. The real consequences of the reassessment of the Soviet approach to the outside world seem even more important: the INF Treaty signed on 8 December 1987, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the decision to make unilateral reductions in Soviet armed forces by 1991, including the reduction of some tactical nuclear systems in Europe and the reduction of its own military budget by 14 percent, and its constructive contribution to the Vienna CSCE conference. "Nowhere in NATO is the difference in opinions of Soviet intentions as great as in the political thinking of West Germany and the United States," remarked J. Dean, one of the American Union of Concerned Scientists' leading experts.⁵

In this case the Soviet factor influenced the very essence of the ally relationship between the United States and the FRG. The "enemy image" cultivated throughout the postwar period in West Germany with the help of the United States and, in some cases, with our help as well, had two basic premises: An alien political system was striving, in the opinion of many Westerners, to establish itself throughout the world; its colossal military strength (although it could have been developed as a reaction), surpassing the combined capabilities of the West European countries, was viewed in Bonn as an instrument for the attainment of this goal. Ruling circles in the FRG believed (and many still believe) that the only way of counteracting this strength and neutralizing the threat it posed was reliance on the United States in security matters. For some time, as long as there were no other options, or as long as no one looked for them, this alliance pleased both sides. Later, however, it became increasingly obvious that they had outgrown it and that the interests of the ruling elite in the two countries did not always coincide completely. The existing structure of bilateral and multilateral (primarily within the NATO framework) ties impeded the realization of the FRG's national interests in the system of East-West relations. Besides this, we must admit that another contributing factor was the reckless attempt of the Soviet leadership of that time to build up sufficient military strength to oppose all potential adversaries in the world, who increased in number and formed close alliances in response to this leadership's obsession with military strength.

The process of democratization in the Soviet Union began to destroy the "enemy image" in the FRG. Although socialist pluralism differs from the Western variety, there is already a bridge connecting them, and this means that the two societies—Soviet and West German—are not as isolated from one another as before. The current Soviet leadership's realization that its colossal military strength could be regarded, regardless of its intentions, as a threat in Western Europe led to the conviction that these fears had to be removed by means of negotiation, and in some cases by means of unilateral action. The real moves in this direction evoked a particularly favorable response in the FRG. "Around 80 percent of the West Germans no longer believe that the Russians are preparing for an attack on Western Europe," T. Sommer remarked.⁶ The prospect of

a new chapter in the relations between the two states now seems completely genuine. What are the factors contributing to this, in addition to those listed above? Apparently, the interests of the FRG and the USSR in Europe and in the international arena are either similar or parallel in several respects. Where do they coincide?

Does Bonn Need a "Nuclear Europe"?

The Soviet Union is actively striving for the demilitarization of international (European) relations. This would reduce the significance of the military factor in these relations. It would cease to be the main source of the influence of states (or groups of states) in the world. This influence would then depend on other factors—political, economic, financial, scientific, technical, and others. It appears that this might be of the greatest importance to Bonn, because it is in these areas that it has revealed its strength, and it is precisely these factors that determine its influence in the outside world. Of course, West Germany is also strong in the military sense: It has the largest and most militarily efficient army in Europe. For reasons of a historical nature which are still significant today, however, Bonn could hardly use its military strength against any adversary autonomously in the foreseeable future. This possibility is excluded by ethical considerations and by the quadripartite responsibility of the great powers to ensure that war never enters our world by way of German territory. Many politicians in the FRG are realizing that their country's international potential would be secured best by the kind of world (European) order in which military strength will be of little or no value. For this reason, in spite of the many disagreements between the USSR and the FRG with regard to security issues, stemming from the absence of the necessary trust, the Soviet efforts to demilitarize international relations will eventually correspond to the national interests of West Germany. This is the first point at which the interests of the two states coincide. American political leaders realize that the devaluation of the military factor in international relations will inevitably weaken their influence in the FRG, and this is why people in Washington sometimes feel nostalgia for the "Soviet threat."

Second, the Soviet Union is in favor of a nuclear-free Europe and the eventual total destruction of all nuclear weapons on earth in principle. At this time these proposals evoke ambivalent feelings in Bonn. In the upper echelon of the FRG, the role of nuclear weapons in European security in general and West German security in particular is the topic of lively discussion, and the possibility of preventing war on the continent without "nuclear deterrents" is being debated. Bonn is accustomed to relying on American "nuclear guarantees," primarily because this has been easier and more comfortable and because there has been no clear and promising alternative until now.

At the same time, the presence, and even the predominance, of the nuclear factor in international relations cannot be convenient for the West German establishment for at least two reasons: First, because Bonn has virtually no chance of ever having its own nuclear weapons (whereas this is possible for, for example, Israel, Pakistan, and South

Africa, and theoretically possible for around 20 other "threshold states"). According to a survey conducted in 1984, 52 percent of the French (as against 15 percent), 56 percent of the English (against 25 percent), and 74 percent of the West Germans themselves (against 10 percent) do not want the FRG to ever have nuclear weapons.⁷ The FRG will always rank below the present and future nuclear powers in this respect. Bonn is already suffering from this inferiority complex. West Germany is the strongest and most stable power in Europe in the economic sense, but in terms of political influence it is on the same level with France and England, which are inferior to the FRG in economic potential but compensate (and more than compensate) for this with their nuclear status. These countries, just as the other European states and apparently the United States, are hardly likely to ever consent to West Germany's acquisition of nuclear status in the future. In the second place, Europe, especially the FRG, is filled with tactical nuclear weapons today. Because of this, the West German public and the establishment are worried that West Germany (or both German states) will unavoidably become the nuclear battlefield in the event of an armed conflict. "The Germans know," DER SPIEGEL observed, "that any war between the blocs will have a devastating effect on their territory."⁸ This possibility is so distinct that even Paris has kindly offered to unfurl its nuclear umbrella over West German territory. West German politicians and experts are unlikely to be impressed by this prospect, although transitory considerations could certainly influence the level of their public concern about this issue. One thing is absolutely clear: There is a growing conviction in West Germany (shared by a large part of the ruling elite) that the country will be in a hopeless position in a nuclear war. For this reason, it is not surprising that Bonn was the first of the NATO states to consent to the Soviet proposal of talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This decision, which evoked a chain reaction in the alliance, will create favorable opportunities to lower the level of nuclear confrontation on the continent.

In spite of the vacillation of U.S. ruling circles with regard to "nuclear deterrence," vacillation engendered by the hope of completing the SDI program, they still believe that the presence of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe will preclude a military conflict on the continent, including a nuclear conflict. For this reason, they feel that nuclear weapons should be modernized instead of being eliminated. For the West Germans, however, the emphasis on modernization would perpetuate, and not eliminate, their hopeless position in any military conflict on the continent.

The Soviet concept of a "nuclear-free Europe" would solve this problem almost completely for the FRG. It is quite a different matter that the implementation of this idea under present conditions seems to be a much more difficult matter (because it would require the consent of the East and the West) than modernization (which would require only the decision of one bloc, although there is still no consensus on this matter even in this one bloc). The talks on conventional arms in Europe, and on tactical nuclear weapons in the future, could certainly shorten the road to a nuclear-free continent.

The third point at which the interests of the USSR and the FRG coincide stems from the absence of economic rivalry between them. The opposite is more likely, because the FRG is the USSR's main Western partner. The stagnation in the Soviet economy and the bureaucratization and inflexibility of the foreign trade mechanism, however, seriously impeded the development of bilateral economic ties. There has been livelier activity in this sphere during the period of perestroika, although the absence of a free market and a convertible ruble in the Soviet Union cannot contribute to a qualitative breakthrough. Banks in the FRG extended credit in the amount of 1.7 billion dollars to the USSR in 1988. New forms of economic relations are being developed. West German companies are participating in 87 of the USSR's 367 joint ventures with Western firms. This is higher than the figure for any other country.

Of course, the volumes of Bonn's commercial relations with the USSR and the United States are incomparable—in quantity and quality. Washington still has an absolute advantage here. American-West German economic relations, however, are causing conflicts between the two countries and alienating them from one another, primarily as a result of stronger protectionist measures on both sides, whereas the development of Soviet-West German economic ties is bringing the two states closer together.

The development of the USSR's economic ties with the United States and the FRG is influenced by the attitudes of their ruling circles toward the Soviet perestroika. Both believe that perestroika on the whole is in the Western interest, but the prevailing opinion in Washington is that the financial support (in the form of credit) of Soviet economic reforms would be counterproductive at this time because it could create the illusion (as it already did in the USSR and in Poland in the 1970's) that the country's socioeconomic problems can be solved simply by acquiring the latest technology and management techniques from the West, and that radical economic and political reforms can be postponed. According to Washington officials, the possibility of real assistance, including sizable credits, will be considered only when the productivity and irreversibility of these reforms become apparent.

In Bonn the problem is seen in a different light. Officials there believe that the irreversibility of perestroika in the USSR has not been secured yet, and the main problem is that broad segments of the population still have not experienced its results in the socioeconomic sphere. If positive changes are not seen in this area in the next 2 or 3 years, the conservative forces advocating a "firm hand" could gain stronger influence in the country. Of course, the West cannot exert much influence on the processes taking place in the USSR: Their results will depend primarily on internal efforts. Participation by the West could, however, facilitate the resolution of some difficult economic problems in the USSR. This could objectively help to strengthen the forces on the side of perestroika.

This difference in the approaches of ruling circles in the two countries to the Soviet perestroika led to arguments between them when several West European states announced their intention to extend sizable credits to the Soviet Union. "It would be a tragic error if Western capital gave the USSR a chance to evade the inevitable choice of either 'guns' or 'butter,'" Senator W. Bradley said.⁹ Congress asked the President to investigate the matter. An official FRG spokesman refuted the American insinuations. "These are absolutely private agreements between European banks and their partners in the Soviet Union, and the government cannot interfere," he declared.¹⁰

Of course, the West German Government's position is also influenced by the business community, which has shown a greater interest than American businessmen in commercial contacts with the East. The diversification of foreign economic relations is extremely important to a country where 28 percent of the GNP is sold through the foreign market (in contrast to 9 percent in the United States), and Bonn is trying to resist American pressure in this area.

The fourth factor is connected with the future, and probably the extremely distant future, but it can already have some effect on U.S.-FRG-USSR relations today. The idea of uniting the two German states through the free will of their people is recorded in the preamble to the Basic Law of the FRG. In view of current European realities, however, members of the country's political and scientific communities and the general public now have extremely skeptical views regarding the possibility of implementing this idea in the foreseeable future. The issue is now more likely to be associated by experts and politicians with the prospects for the creation of a system of mutual security, the development of interdependence, and the humanization of international relations on the continent. "European peace is more important than German unity," E. Barr admits in his "Response to Gorbachev."¹¹

The Soviet Union favors the preservation of the current situation, the continued normalization of relations between the two German states, and the development of mutually beneficial cooperation between them. History will ultimately find the best possible model of interaction for all concerned sides. From the methodological standpoint, this pattern of action seems satisfactory. Much will depend on the Europe which emerges as a result of the concerted efforts of the East and the West.

In the FRG the Soviet concept of the "common European home" is interpreted as a policy line aimed at surmounting the division of the continent. In the opinion of the West German public, the parallel existence of the two German states in addition to the two blocs is a symbol of this division. Therefore, many West Germans believe that the Soviet concept of Europe will ultimately settle the German question in one way or another. Furthermore, some experts in the FRG (and, incidentally, in the United States) feel that the USSR could agree with the idea of "reunification" in some form in the future on the condition of the neutrality of the future union. Why? Because a neutral

Germany (with the appropriate guarantees from permanent Security Council members) would exclude the possibility of a politico-military alliance aimed against the USSR. Of course, these ideas are being fed by the mounting feelings in support of neutrality in West Germany itself.

Washington's approach to the idea of "reuniting" the two German states is completely different. Although American politicians officially support the idea, most of them do not want this reunification to take place and even regard the possibility of a German state with a population of 80 or 90 million in the center of Europe as a nightmare. "On the international level, a united Germany would be too big and dynamic for any stable European system," D. Calleo remarked.¹² This state would automatically become the main driving force of West European development, and Washington prefers to exploit the balance of power among its main allies—the FRG, France, and England—in its European policy. Calleo might be right, but the danger is that some American politicians, including U.S. government officials, are trying to alienate the FRG from the USSR by playing irresponsible games with the idea of "reunification" at a time when the necessary conditions for this do not exist in Europe, and they are not even considering the possible consequences of their actions: outbursts of political extremism, the suspicion of intentions, especially in territorial matters, etc. The politicians in Bonn are in a fairly complex position: On the one hand, they must be impressed by the American support, but on the other, they would rather have some hope of solving the problem in the future than cancel out this hope by taking rash action in the present.

The fact that the interests of the USSR and the FRG are converging in many promising areas where the interests of the FRG and the United States now diverge is being acknowledged by more and more members of the political and scientific communities and the public in West Germany. Many experts admit, especially in private conversations, that they do not see much chance of the augmentation of Bonn's role in Europe and the world through alliance with the United States or even within the framework of European integration: The Americans and the European allies of the FRG are wary of the growth of its political strength and would like to keep it under control and use it only in their own egotistical interests. For this reason, a rise in the status of Soviet-West German relations in Europe, in East-West affairs, and in the world is certainly in Bonn's interest because it would augment its political weight in all three areas.

Possible Options...

Some West German politicians and experts have ambivalent feelings about whether the FRG should play a more active and independent role in Europe, especially in East-West relations. On the one hand, these doubts are evidently the result of the protracted inferiority complex stemming from historical experience. On the other, they are connected with uncertainty and skepticism, especially with regard to the immediate political advantages Bonn could derive from convergence with the East. Could they

justify the transfer of West German policy in this area to a new qualitative state? Finally, Bonn is worried about a certain degree of isolation in the West. It realizes that if it goes too far in building a relationship with the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries and gets ahead of its allies in this process, it would arouse serious irritation, primarily in France, possibly in England, and certainly in the United States.

While the FRG is developing its relations with the East, it would like to have strong rear support in the West: The stronger this support is and the more stable and smooth West Germany's relations with the United States are, the further ruling circles in the FRG will be willing to go in building a relationship with the Soviet Union. Bonn is taking every opportunity to stress that its "eastern policy" is not in any sense an alternative to its ally relationship with the United States, and it is oversensitive in its reactions whenever the Soviet news media discuss any problem in relations between the two powers as the beginning of a possible West German break with Washington. Furthermore, members of the American political community have the same tendency, J. Dean pointed out, "to regard any zigzag in West German foreign policy which deviates from the American line as a significant move in the direction of the Soviet Union."¹³ It is completely obvious that this lack of trust must irritate the West Germans.

The present situation in the upper echelon of the West German Government with regard to security issues in the interrelations within the U.S.-FRG-USSR triangle is unique because Bonn no longer believes everything the Americans say, but it still does not trust the Soviet Union completely either. An important consideration here is that the relations between these countries are developing within the confines of structures left over from the past.

Under these conditions, which varieties of American-West German relations can be anticipated in the future, with a view to the influence of the Soviet factor? "In the broadest context," D. Calleo observed, "the FRG has traditionally had three varieties of relationships with the outside world: Atlantic, European, and Eastern."¹⁴ The U.S.-FRG-USSR complex of relations looks different from each of these vantage points.

The first presupposes the continuation of the previous line of strengthening American-West German ties within the NATO framework. It reflects the conservative thinking that gained a strong position in the FRG not only on the level of the ruling elite, but also, and to a considerable extent, in the public mind. In the opinion of advocates of this tendency, it would be the height of recklessness to give up something that already works. Everything will eventually go back to the way it was—the United States, the USSR, the Soviet perestroika, and the new mood in Washington. The alliance and Bonn's reliance on the United States, however, provided West Germany, in their opinion, with 40 years of peace and a level of prosperity the country never had before in its history. The West Germans, according to *NEWSWEEK* magazine, "still

regard NATO as an essential factor in the defense of Western Europe and are willing to pay for its continued existence."¹⁵ The Soviet factor is important and the changes in the USSR are promising, but there is no guarantee of their irreversibility yet, and therefore they could hardly serve as a point of departure for Bonn's long-range foreign policy strategy. Of course, Washington and the FRG have differences of opinion, and extremism and egotism do exist in American politics, but they can be surmounted by stronger loyalty to Washington and by more active efforts to influence it instead of opposing it.

The apologists for the second variety of relations assert that the FRG should not assign priority to the United States (which is increasingly likely to ignore the interests of its allies) or the Soviet Union in its foreign policy strategy, especially in security matters. Bonn's future is connected with European construction, with West European integration—economic, political, and military. The political prerequisites will be established by the implementation of the United Europe Act (December 1985), calling for the creation of a region without borders by 1992, a region where the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital will be guaranteed, where the main issues will be settled not by a consensus, but by a majority vote, and where cooperation by 12 states in the foreign policy sphere will be organized. The FRG's economic strength will give it a chance to occupy a prominent position in the European Community and to decide its future development in line with its own interests. "The Federal Republic will not be the same after 1992," H. Kohl said.¹⁶ Bonn could deal with the United States and the USSR as equals, with the backing of the growing strength of Western Europe, and it is conceivable that the community could mediate Soviet-American relations and regulate their rivalry and their convergence. In any case, H. Schmidt believes, "we must be the United States' friends, and not its dependent clients."¹⁷ In this area, however, there is a disturbing issue. If West European integration should proceed with an emphasis on the military aspect, this would considerably augment the role of France, and possibly of England, in the community, and these two could supplant Bonn. The degree of importance assigned to the military component of integration will also depend largely on Soviet policy.

In the third variety, the Soviet factor in its new dimension is the main point of reference. The changes taking place in the Soviet Union are establishing a solid foundation for the consideration and eventual establishment of a system of mutual security in Europe, acceptable to all sides and excluding the possibility of surprise attacks by states (or alliances) on one another and of broad offensive operations. "Stability between NATO and the Warsaw Pact (and, consequently, in Europe) would be achieved if no military attack had a chance of success," said E. Barr, prominent SPD official.¹⁸ This kind of stability was not achieved through the uninterrupted buildup of military efforts, but today it can be achieved through negotiations with the Soviet Union, demonstrating the new political thinking.

Mutual security is not only a way of preserving civilization, but also a way of mutually surmounting the "enemy image" and the division of the continent into hostile blocs, a way of creating a cooperating Europe instead of a confrontational one, a Europe working as a group to surmount the problems facing its people. The "common European home" (some West German political scientists prefer the term "new European order") is an appealing and promising idea. The advantages of this alternative for ruling circles in the FRG would consist in the fact that it would guarantee the country's security and the demilitarization of European relations and would also give it a chance to use its economic strength to exercise influence in Europe and the world. By maintaining friendly relations with the United States but not depending on its nuclear and other guarantees, Bonn could become the more equal partner of Moscow and Washington, not to mention London and Paris. In the opinion of several West German experts, however, there is still no certainty as to the potential stability of a new European order.

Apparently, at this time none of the three tendencies listed above has been chosen as the best option by the West German leadership. There is sufficient proof of the validity of this assumption in Bonn's attempts to move in all three directions simultaneously, although at different speeds, "avoiding one specific direction that would shut out the possibility of others."¹⁹ The absence of a clear choice, however, is also a new development, because it means that each of these tendencies has a real chance of success. M.S. Gorbachev's trip to Bonn confirmed this. The rise of USSR-FRG relations to the level of a political partnership and the realization of both sides (recorded in a joint statement) that the positive development of their relations will be of cardinal importance to the situation in Europe, and in East-West relations in general, testify that the foreign policy of the USSR and the FRG has the potential to strengthen European and international stability.

Footnotes

1. NEWSWEEK, 7 November 1988, p 12.
2. THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 8 January 1989.
3. D. Calleo, "Beyond American Hegemony. The Future of the Western Alliance," New York, 1987, p 184.
4. DER SPIEGEL, 29 February 1988, p 32.
5. J. Dean, "Watershed in Europe," Lexington (Mass.), 1987, p 237.
6. NEWSWEEK, 7 November 1988, p 12.
7. L'EXPANSION, 25 May 1984, p 86.
8. DER SPIEGEL, 29 February 1988, p 35.
9. INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 22-23 October 1988.
10. Ibid.
11. DER STERN, 11 February 1988, p 31.
12. D. Calleo, "The German Problem Reconsidered," Cambridge-London, 1986, p 1.
13. J. Dean, Op. cit., p 232.
14. D. Calleo, "Beyond American Hegemony," p 183.
15. NEWSWEEK, 7 November 1988, p 13.
16. THE FINANCIAL TIMES, 10 October 1988.
17. DIE ZEIT, 5 November 1988.
18. DER STERN, 4 February 1988, p 31.
19. D. Calleo, "Beyond American Hegemony," p 183.

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HISTORY

Berezhkov Defends Hitler-Stalin Pact, Secret Protocols

18030015d Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 89 pp 42-45

[Article by Valentin Mikhaylovich Berezhkov, doctor of historical sciences and senior consulting scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "On the Eve of War"; words in boldface as published]

[Text] It has been almost 50 years since the start of World War II—the bloodiest, most brutal, and most devastating war in human history. The causes of the war, the decisions made by the politicians governing the great powers of that time, and the possible alternative options on the threshold of this monstrous worldwide massacre are still the object of speculation today for the veterans of the war and for the people of subsequent generations whose lives were affected by the events of half a century ago. In my opinion, the following points warrant special consideration.

First, there are arguments over whether armed conflict could have been prevented and a peaceful solution could have been found for the problems engendered by the Versailles system and by subsequent political developments, especially in Europe, which became the epicenter of the explosion. In particular, there are arguments about the non-aggression pact the Soviet Union and Germany signed on 23 August 1939. Some people feel that this pact was the detonator of the conflict because it allowed Hitler to make short work of Poland, and it was this that caused England and France to declare war on Germany. Others—and I agree with them—are certain that **there was no alternative to this pact in the situation that had taken shape by fall 1939, at least in the USSR.** The talks the Soviet Government had been conducting for several months with London and Paris had reached an impasse, proving that the English and French politicians of that time were avoiding any serious agreement with Moscow on the repulsion of fascist aggression and were hoping to send

Hitler eastward. Furthermore, Germany already had non-aggression pacts with Poland (1934) and with France (1938). When British Premier Chamberlain returned to London after concluding the Munich accord, which decided Czechoslovakia's fate, he said that he had brought peace for an entire generation. The accord won approval in the United States. In a letter to Chamberlain, President Roosevelt remarked: "I completely share your hope that the grand possibility of establishing a new order based on justice and law will now exist for many years."

If the Soviet Government had refused to sign a non-aggression pact, Hitler would have had a chance to say that only the Bolsheviks were opposing the "establishment of a just peace" and that united effort would be needed to "save European civilization" from the "Soviet threat." Officials in Moscow also had to consider the fact that although the English and French had given Poland and Romania guarantees, they had left the Baltic question open, as if they were pointing the Nazi invaders in the right direction for an invasion of the USSR. What is more, the regimes of that time in the Baltic states openly declared their pro-German views and their hostile feelings for the Soviet Union. In view of all this, there was no reason to believe that Moscow could gain a better relationship with the Western democracies by rejecting the pact with Germany. It was no secret, after all, that after 20 August 1939 a plane on the airfield in Tempelhof in Berlin was ready to take Goering to London if Ribbentrop's talks should be broken off in Moscow.

It is indicative that although England and France had declared war on Germany following the Wehrmacht's invasion of Poland, they did nothing throughout the entire period of the so-called "phony war." At the beginning of 1940, however, an Anglo-French expeditionary corps was hastily formed to be sent to Finland. If we had not signed a peace treaty with the Finns in March 1940, we would probably have had to go to war with England and France. All of this sheds light on the prevailing mood in the upper echelons of the Western democracies at that time: They were still hoping that Hitler would continue moving eastward after the attack on Poland.

Second, the "secret additional protocol" to the Soviet-German non-aggression pact is the subject of heated debates. The existence of this protocol is being debated. No original copy has been found in our country or in the FRG. Incidentally, **Bonn officially announced recently that the German original copy of the protocol was destroyed on Hitler's orders.** The FRG Government simultaneously confirmed the authenticity of the existing photocopy. It is possible that the **original Russian copy of the protocol was destroyed on Stalin's orders in 1947.** It was then that he asked Vyshinskiy to compile the "SOVINFORMBURO [Soviet Information Bureau] report" entitled "The Falsifiers of History." It vehemently denied the existence of the protocol, the text of which was first published at that time by the Americans in a collection of documents on "Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941."

It is interesting that in a recent interview in West Germany's DER SPIEGEL,¹ A.A. Gromyko recalled what Molotov said to him about the secret protocol: "Do not acknowledge the existence of any documents other than those we publish." Gromyko concluded from this that there was no protocol, but it could have been something else, namely Molotov's reinforcement of Stalin's decision to conceal the protocol. There were several references to a "secret protocol," however, during the talks preceding the conclusion of the Soviet-German non-aggression pact.

The "additional protocol conceding to the wishes of the Soviet Government" is mentioned in a personal letter from Hitler to Stalin of 20 August 1939. In response to this message, the Soviet leader consented to Ribbentrop's arrival in Moscow on 23 August. During Molotov's talks with Hitler in the Imperial Chancellery in Berlin in fall 1940 (I was present at these talks as an interpreter), the people's commissar of foreign affairs mentioned the supplementary protocol, particularly when he demanded the withdrawal of German troops from Finland, which was included in the Soviet sphere of interest by the terms of the protocol.

Finally, subsequent events also confirmed the statements in the now available photocopy of the protocol. Some people do not understand why all of the points of the protocol were not implemented later. The line of demarcation in Poland, for example, was not drawn along the Vistula, as it was in the recently distributed copy of the protocol, and Lithuania turned out to be in the Soviet sphere of interest instead of the German sphere. The conclusion drawn from this is that the photocopy is a forgery. The explanation, however, is that the agreement concluded during Ribbentrop's second visit to Moscow on 28 September 1939, **the Soviet-German treaty on friendship and borders, was also accompanied by a secret additional protocol, which amended the "protocol of 23 August":** Lublin and Warsaw provinces were transferred to the German sphere of interest, and the appropriate border was established along the Bug; Lithuania was simultaneously included in the Soviet Union's sphere of interest.

Now we often hear about the immorality of this pact. From the standpoint of today's code of ethics, the agreement between Stalin and Hitler was certainly immoral, and I agree completely with this harsh judgment. We must remember, however, that the concept of morality half a century ago, especially in international affairs, was somewhat different. At that time the use of war as an instrument of international policy was a recognized standard of behavior. Even President Roosevelt was able to call the disgraceful Munich accord, which turned Czechoslovakia over to the Nazi monster, a step toward the establishment of an order based on "justice and law."

Third, the preoccupation with the authenticity of the existing photocopy of the protocol seems to have diverted attention from the essence of the problem and from an analysis of what happened after the Soviet-German non-aggression pact was signed and why it happened, including an analysis of subsequent events in the Baltic zone. Here is

one example. Some Lithuanian historians are demanding the repeal of the "protocol of 23 August 1939." But after all, in addition to everything else, it stipulated that Vilnius, which was then part of Poland, would be turned over to Lithuania. If the protocol were to be annulled, would this mean that Vilnius would be returned to Poland and that Kaunas would once again be the capital of Lithuania, as it was before August 1939? Of course not! After all, the nullification of an international act of the past cannot change what actually happened. As for the non-aggression pact, it ceased to exist, both *de facto* and *de jure*, as soon as Hitler's Germany invaded the territory of the USSR, and this is what Ribbentrop said on the night of 22 June 1941 when Soviet Ambassador Dekanozov, whom I accompanied as an interpreter, was called to Willemstrasse and was told that German troops had crossed the Soviet border 2 hours earlier on Hitler's orders.

Those who now see the events of 1940 simply as the "occupation of the Baltic zone" by the Red Army are distorting the facts. The older generation remembers that the USSR's conclusion of treaties on mutual assistance with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia was then regarded by most of the inhabitants of those countries as deliverance from Nazi occupation. The bourgeois regimes were liberalized at the same time. The people who had been imprisoned by reactionary forces were released. The social democratic, communist, and other parties resumed their activity. The genuine enthusiasm expressed at mass rallies and meetings in all three republics evinced the real feelings of most of the public in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. It was on this wave of enthusiasm that the Baltic states became part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Later, however, the Baltic zone was seized by tragic events. Stalin's emissaries—Vyshinskiy, Zhdanov, and Dekanozov—arrived in Vilnius, Riga, and Tallinn. A campaign was launched against the "enemies of the people" during the subsequent period of spy-mania. The unfair exchange rate of the ruble in relation to local currencies led to shortages and emptied the stores. The notorious practices of the dispossession of the kulaks and forced collectivization then began to be carried out. All of this naturally evoked protests, and those who attended protest rallies were accused of being counterrevolutionaries. They were arrested and deported. Many innocent people suffered in these campaigns. Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania had to go through the same torture the people of all Soviet republics experienced during the Stalin years.

Fourth, recently, on the threshold of the 50th anniversary of the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, some Western press organs, including American ones, have been spreading rumors about what they refer to as "preventive war": They are alleging that the Soviet Union was planning to attack Germany in summer 1941 and that Hitler forestalled Stalin by delivering the first strike. More grist for the mill was added when the book entitled "Ice-Breaker: Stalin's Plans for Hitler" was published in the West at the beginning of this year. Its author, a man named Viktor Suvorov, supposedly worked on the General Staff in Moscow and then fled to England in 1985. As West

Germany's FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE (27 April 1989) points out, however, the author's reports of the Soviet Union's intention to invade Germany in June 1941 are not supported by any kind of documented evidence and are unconvincing in general. His lies are now being studied by historians, especially in the FRG.

In essence, we are dealing here with an attempt to revive the false arguments in the so-called "Hitler Memorandum," justifying Hitler's aggression with the supposed "Soviet threat" looming over Germany. Irrefutable documents on the preparations for Hitler's invasion of the USSR have been available for a long time, but there is not a shred of evidence of Moscow's intention to start a war against Germany in summer 1941. On the contrary, up to the end, Stalin was willing to do anything within his power to prevent an armed conflict. Soviet shipments of grain, oil, and strategic raw materials were still going to Germany even on the night of 22 June 1941, whereas the German side had ceased to observe its delivery commitments a few months before the invasion. On Saturday, 21 June, the Soviet ambassador received orders from Moscow to arrange for a meeting with Ribbentrop as soon as possible and convey the Soviet Government's offer of a meeting between the leaders of the two countries without delay, so that measures could be taken to prevent a conflict. The Soviet side expressed its willingness to listen to any German demands. The ambassador, however, was unable to carry out these instructions because the war was already raging.

The people who are spreading the groundless rumors about Hitler's "preventive war" today are obviously trying to absolve the Nazi criminals of all blame. They hope to simultaneously revive the almost defunct thesis of the "Soviet threat." It is impossible, however, to rewrite the verdict of history—an incorruptible judge.

Footnotes

1. DER SPIEGEL, 24 April 1989, p 170.

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MANAGEMENT

U.S. Business Said Sluggish in Adopting New Management Methods

18030015e Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 89 pp 85-89

[Article by Valeriy Yevgenyevich Khrutskiy, candidate of economic sciences and scientific associate at Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies: "Striving for Excellence"]

[Text] American industry is losing its ability to manufacture items meeting current quality requirements and consumer needs. This is not being disputed in the United States. Furthermore, it has become the cause of serious worry in the U.S. business and scientific communities. What are the Americans doing to stop these negative tendencies?

American companies changed their economic strategy in the 1980's, made serious adjustments in their investment policy, and invested huge sums in the retooling of enterprises and expected this to enhance the competitive potential of U.S. industrial firms dramatically. This did not happen, however, and an answer to the question of why competitive potential was not enhanced can be found in an interesting book by renowned management consultants E. Hufe and A. Anderson.¹

Judge for yourselves: In the last 15 years more than 20 billion dollars was spent just on systems for the automated control of production processes in industry. New enterprises representing the height of engineering thought and personifying the latest miracles of electronics and robot engineering appeared on the economic map of the United States. These were firms like MAZAK in Florence (Kentucky), representing a genuine collection of flexible production modules, machine tools with numerical control, robots, test equipment, and other systems costing from 5 million to 20 million dollars each. This is also an accurate description of the General Motors assembly plant in Hamtramck (Michigan). Nevertheless, these American companies continued to lose ground in the competitive struggle in the 1980's. These two companies and many other new enterprises are losing their competitive edge and have lower indicators of quality and efficiency than Japanese firms located nearby, in the United States. Why is this happening?

The main reason is that American business may have changed its investment priorities, but it did not make any changes in the systems and methods of production organization and management and did not bring them in line with the requirements of the new automated equipment and technology. To restore the United States' earlier industrial strength, the most important thing today is the cultivation of new managerial thinking and a new managerial philosophy in American executives. Fundamentally new approaches are needed in industrial production today for the successful accomplishment of what seem to be mutually exclusive tasks: the simultaneous enhancement of quality and productivity, the flexibility of production, and its receptivity to innovation.

Let us return to the book by Hufe and Anderson. Above all, it is interesting because it reveals the material prerequisites of the new managerial philosophy and the "quiet revolution" in American management, which has been discussed so extensively, but often superficially, in American economic literature and in our own.

The structure of production costs has changed dramatically. Expenditures of live labor represent 2-10 percent of the cost of production in U.S. industry. Material and energy costs, the cost of equipment maintenance and operation, and transportation and storage costs constitute the main portion of production costs. Product assortment and quality requirements are higher. For this reason, the quicker installation and adjustment of industrial equipment and incorporation of new items or technologies in production are of decisive importance in enhancing the

effectiveness of industrial production. For this reason, the authors of the book describe the essence of the new managerial thinking concisely as a constant struggle against all types of losses.

The new managerial thinking includes the following elements. Above all, there is a constant search for ways of improving the methods and forms of production organization and ways of enhancing productivity, the flexibility and efficiency of production, product quality, and the level of customer service. There is less emphasis on major technological breakthroughs and huge investments in production to finance large-scale renovation projects than on constant, daily improvements in the enterprise's production potential, improvements that might seem insignificant because they are not chosen for their publicity value. Here there is no possibility of assigning priority to quality or the reduction of overhead costs to the detriment of the level of customer service or production flexibility. All indicators of management and production efficiency must be improved simultaneously. This requires only a constant search for ways of reducing losses. The result is the simultaneous reduction of overhead costs and improvement of product quality.

This requires the constant involvement of employees on all levels, including rank-and-file workers and managerial personnel, in the investigation of problems and in the decision-making process. This is not a simple matter. Most workers have neither the ability (because they lack the necessary knowledge) nor the desire to take a real part in making managerial decisions and taking on the related risk and responsibility. Everything that seems good and even natural to the entrepreneur and innovator, with their insatiable hunger for new things, seems incomprehensible, unnecessary, and uninteresting to the common worker, particularly if he is of advanced years. On the average, from 5 to 10 percent of the enterprise wage fund should be used for this purpose.

Hufe and Anderson constantly compare American and Japanese management techniques. "The constant search for ways of improving production and management by involving all employees is the rule in the leading Japanese industrial firms." It is no coincidence that the example set by Japanese firms has made indicators of participation by workers and employees in the efficient organization of work the main indicators of economic performance today. In 1984 U.S. industrial firms had only one efficiency proposal from each employee on the average, whereas Toyota enterprises had 35 proposals per worker, 95 percent of which were assimilated in production. In the authors' opinion, this is precisely why Toyota now sets the style and the standard throughout the world.

Another element of the new thinking in production seems particularly important to the advocates of the new managerial thinking in the United States—the approach to quality control. Above all, there is an iron-clad rule that everything must be done right from the very beginning—i.e., there must be no defects from the first moment that a

new item or technology enters the production cycle. Usually, from 20 to 40 percent of the expenditures connected with inferior product quality are due to something that was done incorrectly from the very beginning. In quality control, the authors of the book say, it is more important for the product to meet the specific needs of the consumer than to correspond to standards and specifications. Specifications and standards might or might not correspond to the needs of the consumer. Besides this, it is difficult for the consumer to speak in the language of specifications, instructions, or normative documents, and it is absolutely impossible to describe the feelings of the consumer in numerical terms.

Within the context of the new managerial thinking, the consumer is not only the customer who buys the final product, but also any person who takes part in production in a subsequent stage of the technological cycle. This might be simply a worker in another shop. In any case, the consumer is king, and his word is law. Everything, including marketing services and supply, sales, and engineering design offices must help and serve those directly serving the consumer inside and outside the company.

Production schedules, the location of industrial equipment, the layout of the workplace, and so forth are also elements of the new thinking in production. All of the equipment required for the manufacture of items of the same type or families of similar products should be grouped in a single place from the beginning to the end of the technological cycle, in line with what is called the nuclear principle, and not in line with the different types of equipment as in the past, when all milling machines or all pieces of forging and pressing equipment were located in a single place. The advantages of the new layout are the shorter flows of materials, parts, and components, the guarantee of more balanced production, the elimination of bottlenecks at the points between different technological processes, and the accelerated readjustment of equipment for the manufacture of a new product. The traditional layout of industrial equipment was supposed to maximize individual output and was justified when expenditures of live labor (particularly the labor of workers) represented a high percentage of the cost of production. In modern production, the nuclear layout is more efficient and increases the yield on capital considerably. Besides this, the new system provides additional opportunities to involve employees in management and in the resolution of production problems and to introduce group and collective forms of labor organization and incentives. The monitoring of production processes is simplified considerably, and the relationship between labor expenditures and results is more obvious.

As we can see, many of the postulates and axioms of the classical school are being reassessed within the context of the new managerial philosophy. This applies to the set of performance evaluation indicators, forms of labor incentives, the organizational structures of management, etc. Enterprises with world-class production do not, for example, use many of the traditional performance evaluation indicators—individual output norms and various

standards of expenditures of work time per unit of product—because work incentives based on these indicators could cause imbalances in various sectors of production and, consequently, could cause the growth of production stocks, increase the volume of unfinished production, cause the deterioration of quality, and inhibit the submission of efficiency proposals.

The equipment workload indicator, machine shift coefficient, and other such indicators are not used either. An emphasis on these indicators in modern production motivates supervisory personnel to keep the most expensive machines and equipment or whole plants operating day and night. As a result, there is not enough time for the preventive maintenance of equipment, and it is important to practice preventive maintenance instead of waiting until machines are out of order before repairing them. Besides this, the scheduling of enterprise operations in three shifts simply does not leave employees enough time to investigate and solve production problems or improve work methods. The authors of "The Spirit of Manufacturing Excellence" also mention other reasons why these indicators are not part of the new managerial thinking. On the other hand, an increasingly perceptible role is being played by general indicators of production efficiency, measuring the level of use of all types of production resources with a view to their interchangeability, and by systems of interrelated combined indicators of productivity, but never by individual indicators.

Enterprises distinguished by manufacturing excellence commonly use various indicators of the cost of superior and inferior product quality. These generally include the cost of eliminating defects and flaws, the cost of quality control and inspections, warranty services, and the return of products to the consumer, expenditures of the labor of quality engineers, etc. When these indicators are calculated for the first time, they might reveal that the cost of poor quality represents from 20 to 30 percent of the total cost of production (p 43). In other words, it could be from 3 to 10 times as high as expenditures on wages. This fact alone should immediately arouse the interest of managers who are striving to use new methods. Later, as quality improves, the percentage of these expenditures in the cost of production can decline, but the purely economic significance of indicators of the cost of poor quality still remains quite high.

The new managerial thinking is introducing significant changes into the strategy of industrial firms, especially in the very approach to the technical development and improvement of production, to the determination of capital investment patterns and investment policy guidelines in general, to the organization of innovation, and to the incorporation of new equipment and technology. The most essential requirement here is that the reorganization of methods and systems of production organization and management must be carried out before, and not after, the new equipment and technology are acquired, and even before decisions are made on the type of equipment to be acquired. With this approach, it is often discovered that the enhancement of competitive potential and production

efficiency will not necessarily require huge investments in the newest and most expensive equipment.

The incorporation of automation equipment without preliminary preparations for the cultivation of the new managerial thinking, and even attempts to incorporate new equipment and introduce new methods of management simultaneously, can only result in losses and a waste of energy and resources. The new General Motors assembly plant costing 600 million dollars in Hamtramck was designed specifically to represent the height of technical achievement and the last word in contemporary automation, robot engineering, computerization, and high technology. It is true that the plant had 260 robots to assemble and paint the vehicles, 50 automated systems with numerical control to transport parts and components, and whole rows of camcorders attached to computers to monitor production processes, but all of these technical marvels produced only 30 vehicles an hour instead of the projected 60. This model showcase, this loudly advertised "factory of the future," did become a model, but only a model of the complete lack of correspondence between technology and management techniques, an example of the incorrect management of production even after months of training and retraining for the workers and huge expenditures on the education of personnel. It operated at a loss instead of turning a profit and did not enhance efficiency at all.

Of course, Japanese firms are not avoiding automation either, but they are using it in more moderate doses. A new plant of the Mazda Motors company in the same state of Michigan cost 25 percent less than the General Motors plant, and mainly because it did not have the same plethora of automated equipment and electronics. The Mazda plant is producing 240,000 automobiles a year with 3,500 employees, whereas the 5,000 employees of the plant in Hamtramck are producing only 220,000. The higher productivity of Japanese enterprises is supplemented by higher quality, and this is attested to by higher consumer demand.

According to the authors of this book, it is more important today than ever before for managers to realize that state-of-the-art equipment, the most highly skilled manpower, and huge expenditures on the training of workers to operate the new equipment will not and cannot guarantee a high level of productivity and product quality in themselves. Much more impressive results, with older equipment, can be produced by purely managerial means. In the beginning of the 1980's a small Toyota engine plant in Camino was equipped with 1960-vintage models of American machine tools. In the technical sense, it was hopelessly outdated in comparison with modern Ford or Chrysler enterprises, but in terms of output per worker (blue- and white-collar), the Toyota plant produced 4.5 times as many engines as a Ford or Chrysler plant. There was absolutely no comparison between the quality of the Toyota engines, including design features, and the unsightly products of the American automotive giants.

Sometimes it appears that the authors overestimate the role of the management factor in modern production in

their analysis, but world economic practices testify that even the slightest underestimation of the importance of timely improvements in production organization and management can be much more detrimental. In American business, however, the new managerial thinking is being introduced too slowly. Analyzing the reasons for this, the authors concentrate on such factors as the need to surmount low standards of production, the need to teach managers (especially on the highest level) the new managerial philosophy, etc. Of course, this is also important, but it is not the main thing. In a discussion of the reasons why the new managerial thinking originated in Japan, Hugu and Anderson pinpoint the main reason for the high productivity, high standards of production, and superior product quality. Whereas U.S. corporations did not have to face strong competition in the market in the postwar period and felt no need to quickly incorporate the achievements of managerial science in order to survive, Japanese companies always operated in an atmosphere of fierce competition, which was often deliberately intensified by the Japanese Government's economic policy of stimulating the quicker restructuring of industry.

Another reason for the slow incorporation of the new managerial thinking was the resistance of the capitalists and corporate bureaucrats reluctant to take risks. This applies above all to the United States, where the influence of the owners of capital is much stronger than in Japan, if only because the percentage of stock capital and the assets of the average industrial firm in the United States are two or three times as high as in Japan. The very fact that American specialists are paying closer attention to the social and cultural aspects of management today, however, is extremely interesting.

Footnotes

1. E. Hugu and A. Anderson, "The Spirit of Manufacturing Excellence. An Executive Guide to the New Mind Set," Washington, 1988.

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POLITICS AND PEOPLE

Baker, Other State Department Officials Profiled
18030015f Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 89 pp 90-93

[Article by N.B. Tatarinova: "New People in the State Department"]

[Text] James Addison Baker never concealed his ambition to take part in the foreign policy activity of his country. This "impeccable and charming 59-year-old southern gentleman," as he is described in the press, entered politics in 1970 when G. Bush asked him to manage his Senate campaign. Baker has had a brilliant career. He owed his first government office—under secretary of commerce—to George Bush. In 1976 Baker and R. Cheney were the chief strategists of G. Ford's presidential campaign. After Ford lost the race, Baker became one of George Bush's closest

advisers and he ran Bush's campaign in 1980. He was then appointed White House chief of staff during Reagan's first term in office. In this job he clearly revealed his abilities as a skilled, even-tempered, and talented organizer—abilities which were first pointed out by President G. Ford, who called Baker the "ideal team player." In 1984 Baker managed the successful campaign for the re-election of R. Reagan for a second term. In 1985 he was appointed secretary of the treasury and remained in this office until August 1988. In August 1988 he began managing George Bush's campaign, and as soon as Bush had been elected Baker won the position of secretary of state, which he had been seeking so eagerly. His appointment did not come as a surprise to anyone. On the contrary, this had been predicted long before Bush won the election. Observers took this as a sign of firmness and common sense in American foreign policy and as an indication that it would be more purposeful and pragmatic than it had been under the Reagan administration. George Bush and James Baker are united by a 30-year friendship. They have been political colleagues for more than 18 years. Bush even calls Baker his "younger brother."

Baker was the President's main adviser on cabinet appointments and on the hiring of White House staff members. On his advice, the President appointed General Brent Scowcroft his assistant for national security affairs. Richard Darman, one of Baker's old friends, became the director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and this was seen as an indication of Baker's wish to influence domestic policy and budget decisions. Domestic affairs will also be the concern of Deputy Chief of White House Staff Robert Teeter, whom Baker once referred to in a private conversation as his "closest friend in politics." James Cicconi, who once worked for Baker in the White House, was appointed assistant to the chief of staff for correspondence. Baker also has close ties with Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady, who succeeded him in this office in August 1988, and with Secretary of Commerce R. Mosbacher. All of these people have the reputation of politicians who can solve any problems the administration might encounter. They say that Baker knows all of the ins and outs in Washington and is an expert at making use of them (although some people use stronger language to describe him). According to Richard Lugar, member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Baker is the most competent politician in Washington. Lugar even called him a "world-class statesman."

Baker's friends and supporters speak of him with great enthusiasm. He has a good relationship with Congress and is considered to be a "wizard" at dealing with the press. He readily grants interviews, does not shy away from arranging for "information leaks," and shares "confidential" data. He is an excellent tactician who can listen carefully to different points of view and then integrate them. Baker is considered to be a masterful negotiator who is inclined toward compromise and can reconcile even the worst of enemies. He never makes promises he cannot keep, he is highly disciplined, and he is obsessed with his work. People who know him well say that he is a charming man, self-confident without being egotistical. He reads few

books and does not think of himself as an intellectual, but he is quite aware of his strengths and likes to surround himself with knowledgeable people from whom he can expect good advice. Many people who have worked with him say that he genuinely enjoys the company of other people. As someone said, Baker might not be the prime minister, but he is at least the first among equals. He wants to go down in history as the greatest American secretary of state.

Skeptics say, on the other hand, that his positive characteristics have been exaggerated. For example, D. Stockman, the OMB director during Reagan's first term in office, recalls that "in the final analysis, Baker was never well-versed in political issues and did not take much interest in them." Baker's opponents accuse him of a complete lack of convictions and say that he plays the game only to win and that he derives some kind of juvenile pleasure from competition.

According to State Department personnel, the present secretary's *modus operandi* differs radically from the style of his predecessor, G. Shultz, who relied on the assistance of career diplomats, held regular conferences, and involved many people on all levels in the decision-making process. Baker prefers to work with a small group of his closest advisers and to maintain contact with his staff through them. This group of trusted individuals is growing as new people demonstrate their abilities and, in particular, their personal loyalty. Dennis Ross, Robert Zoellick, and Margaret Tutwiler followed him into the building in Foggy Bottom (the name of the place where the State Department is located).

Dennis Ross, a doctor of philosophy, is 40 years old. He is an expert on the Soviet Union and the Middle East. Since 1977 he has worked in the State Department and Defense Department and he was a National Security Council staffer under President Reagan. He was Bush's campaign adviser on foreign policy and is now the director of the office of policy planning in the State Department. In his words, he is responsible for "new conceptual approaches to all of the problems we face."

Robert Zoellick, 35 years old, attracted Baker's attention when he worked for R. Darman, who was then deputy secretary of the treasury. When Baker became secretary of the treasury, he made Zoellick his executive secretary. Zoellick was Bush's campaign adviser on economic issues. He was offered several coveted positions in the new administration (for example, the President's adviser on domestic affairs), but he preferred the office of State Department counselor (his status is the same as an assistant secretary of state). At this time he is responsible for overseeing the information reaching the desk of the secretary of state. His duties include the processing of this information and its presentation to Baker in concise form. Zoellick was Baker's main adviser in working out a compromise agreement with Congress on Central America. Baker calls Ross and Zoellick his "idea men."

Margaret Tutwiler is 38. She has been one of Baker's closest associates since the end of the 1970's. From 1978 to

1980 she was the scheduling director in Bush's presidential campaign, and then in his campaign for the vice-presidency. From 1980 to 1984 she was President Reagan's special adviser and the executive assistant to the White House chief of staff J. Baker. In 1984 and 1985 she was the deputy assistant to the President for political affairs, and from 1985 to 1988 she was the assistant secretary of the treasury for public affairs. In Bush's presidential campaign in 1988, she was the deputy campaign manager and gained the reputation of a "politician with an iron grip." In the State Department she took the job of assistant secretary of state for public affairs, but she is ascribed a more important role. Staffers constantly turn to her to make sure that they understand Baker's instructions.

The number three man in the State Department—42-year-old Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmitt—worked closely with Baker from 1985 to 1987 as the general counsel of the Treasury Department when Baker was secretary of the treasury. Kimmitt is a lieutenant-colonel retired. In the 1980's he was an NSC staffer and the NSC executive secretary and chief legal counsel. Since October 1987 Kimmitt has been a partner in the Washington offices of the Sidley & Austin law firm.

Baker is certainly aware of the necessity and importance of having career diplomats on his side. He appointed Lawrence Sidney Eagleburger, a diplomat for the last 30 years, to the number two position in the State Department. Eagleburger is 59. In 1969 he began working closely with H. Kissinger, President Nixon's adviser on national security affairs, and then served as the political counsel to the U.S. representative to NATO (1969-1971). From 1971 to 1973 he was deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. Then he became the deputy to National Security Adviser H. Kissinger, and when the latter became secretary of state, Eagleburger became deputy under secretary of state for management. From 1973 to 1975 he was an assistant secretary of state. The Carter Administration appointed Eagleburger ambassador to Yugoslavia (1977-1981). After Reagan arrived in the White House, Eagleburger was appointed assistant secretary of state for European affairs, and in 1982 he succeeded W. Stoessel as under secretary for political affairs. In the middle of 1984 Eagleburger became president of Kissinger Associates, a consulting firm whose clients include many foreign governments and leading American and foreign corporations which consult the firm on various matters.

In the State Department Eagleburger is mainly concerned with administrative matters, oversees the daily work of the State Department, and performs the duties of the secretary of state when the latter is traveling abroad. The State Department is one of the most conservative institutions in Washington in its organization and methods of operation. The new leadership wants to introduce its own ideas and make changes in traditional approaches. Baker plans to lower the status of assistant secretaries of state by making them accountable to the under secretaries. The regional

offices of the State Department for European, Latin American, Asian, and African affairs will be under the jurisdiction of under secretaries rather than being directly accountable to the secretary of state, as they have been in the past. Career diplomats feel that this is an impractical idea. They also realize that the secretary of state is becoming virtually inaccessible to staff members not included in his small retinue. The opinion in the foreign policy establishment is that there is no mutual understanding between the State Department staff and Baker's closest associates. Career diplomats would like to have more influence in foreign policymaking. As for Baker's feelings about this, he made the following statement: "I want to be the President's man in the State Department, and not the State Department's man in the White House."

Baker attaches great importance to keeping Bush's promise to take more active steps against nuclear proliferation. In the Reagan administration this was the job of a few State Department offices and executive agencies. Baker intends to raise the status of the under secretary for security assistance, science and technology (and the head of the corresponding division). The division is expected to intensify the struggle against the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and the technology for their production. This division is headed by Reginald Bartholomew, former U.S. ambassador to Spain and Lebanon. In 1977 he was the director of politico-military affairs, and he later served as the special U.S. representative at the American-Greek talks on the future of American military bases in Greece. Bartholomew will also have jurisdiction over the office of politico-military affairs, which is responsible for the preparation of materials for arms limitation talks. He will also be completely responsible for arms control policy.

The State Department has traditionally worked with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in these matters. The new director is Ronald Lehman, a prominent expert on arms control who was assistant secretary of defense for international security policy. In 1982 he took part in the Soviet-American consultations on nuclear non-proliferation, and in 1983 and 1984 he was present at the Soviet-American talks on technical improvements in the line of direct communication between the USSR and the United States. In 1985 he acquired ambassadorial status and was appointed deputy head—and in 1986 the head—of the group on strategic arms at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. In February 1988 he accompanied G. Shultz on his trip to the USSR, and in February 1989 he toured the NATO countries with J. Baker. By law, the agency director is the President's main adviser on arms control, and Baker acknowledges the agency's right to have its own point of view on these matters, but the secretary of state has said that it "must serve as the technical agency for all administration officials involved in arms control."

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CHRONICLE OF U.S.—SOVIET RELATIONS

April-June 1989

18030015g Moscow SSHA: EKONOMIKA, POLITIKA, IDEOLOGIYA in Russian No 8, Aug 89pp 123-127

[Text]

April

1—A USSR-U.S. agreement on diplomat training was signed in Washington. Students, instructors, experts on foreign policy, and professional diplomats will be exchanged regularly.

3—A special issue of TIME magazine, devoted completely to the Soviet Union, was published.

5—In his speech at a grand session of the National Assembly of Cuba, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium M.S. Gorbachev said: "We cannot agree with U.S. Vice-President Quayle's reference to the countries of Central and Latin America as the United States' 'back yard.'"

11—Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.F. Petrovskiy received J. Joyce, the temporary U.S. charge d'affaires in the USSR. They discussed the search for ways of settling the conflict in the Middle East and other topics of mutual interest.

12—The statement of the Warsaw Pact states on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe suggested that the states belonging to the North Atlantic alliance begin separate talks as soon as possible on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear component of dual-purpose weapons. The Warsaw Pact states believe that the mutual refusal of the sides to modernize tactical nuclear weapons would help to establish a favorable political atmosphere for these talks and strengthen trust.

16—In an IZVESTIYA interview, Governor J. Thompson of Illinois supported the return of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union in trade with the United States.

19—Data on the balance of Warsaw Pact and NATO power in tactical nuclear weapons in Europe were published in PRAVDA.

M.S. Gorbachev received W. Winpisinger, vice president of the AFL-CIO and president of the Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, and J. Sheinkman, president of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.

20—A statement by a USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said that the Soviet Union is prepared to conduct, on a mutual basis with the United States, verifications of reported information about Soviet chemical weapon stockpiles. The document mentions the expediency of "inspections within the territory of Warsaw Pact and NATO states to verify the presence or absence of chemical weapons there."

23—President G. Bush of the United States decided to begin deploying the mobile MX missile system and to simultaneously allocate funds for the mobile Midgetman strategic missile.

26—Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E.A. Shevardnadze received B. Lone, prominent American public spokesman and co-chairman of International Physicians for the Prevention of War. The Soviet side quite definitely reaffirmed the USSR's willingness to stop nuclear tests if the United States should decide to do the same.

In the Kremlin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium A.I. Lukyanov received a delegation of American World War II veterans who had been present at the meeting on the Elbe and were in our country as the guests of the Soviet Committee of War Veterans.

28—Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.F. Petrovskiy received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock in Moscow. They discussed several aspects of the activities of the United Nations and its specialized agencies and a number of international and bilateral issues.

May

3-4—Delegations of American and Soviet retired admirals and generals exchanged views at a conference in Washington. A joint statement on the results of the conference was approved and will be sent to the leaders of the USSR and the United States. The document lists the two sides' disarmament proposals that should be implemented first.

6—A delegation of retired Soviet generals and admirals met Chairman L. Aspin of the House Committee on the Armed Services and other American legislators in the U.S. Congress. The head of the Soviet delegation, Maj Gen M.A. Milshteyn, and American Rear-Admiral G. LaRocque, who was also present at the meeting, informed the members of the U.S. Congress of the results of the conference.

7—A statement issued by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that: "The statements by the U.S. administration in favor of the new political thinking are completely inconsistent with its acceptance of the adventurist policy line of Pakistan, which is fanning the flames of war in Afghanistan and urging the most extremist leaders of the Afghan terrorist opposition to continue the fratricide."

10-11—American Secretary of State J. Baker visited Moscow. During a meeting with Baker, M.S. Gorbachev informed him of the additional proposals the Soviet Union would be submitting at the Vienna talks on the reduction of conventional arms and armed forces. They will propose the negotiation of the radical reduction of Warsaw Pact and NATO arms and armed forces in Europe by 1996-1997, so that each military alliance will have equal numbers of the armed forces and arms constituting the subject of the talks in Vienna, namely that each side will retain 1.35 million personnel, 1,500 tactical airplanes, 1,700

combat helicopters, 20,000 tanks, 24,000 artillery pieces, mortars, and rocket launchers, and 28,000 infantry vehicles and armored personnel carriers. They stress that the USSR is willing to remove all nuclear ammunition from the territory of its allies between 1989 and 1991 on the condition that the U.S. side do the same. M.S. Gorbachev also said that the Soviet Union has already decided to unilaterally move 500 warheads of tactical nuclear systems (166 airborne, 50 artillery, and 284 missile) from the territory of its allies to its own territory in 1989.

During these conversations an agreement was reached on the resumption of the work of the delegations at the talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva after 10 June this year. It was announced that the USSR and U.S. delegations would conduct another round of bilateral consultations in Geneva on a chemical weapon ban, in search of mutually acceptable answers to remaining questions, including bilateral confidence-building measures in connection with the drafting of the convention. The sides agreed to resume the full-scale talks on the limitation and prohibition of nuclear tests on 26 June 1989. The USSR minister of foreign affairs and the U.S. secretary of state signed an agreement on behalf of their governments on cooperation in the struggle against pollution in the Bering and Chukchi seas in emergency situations. The sides approved a joint statement on Lebanon. A letter from President G. Bush was delivered to M.S. Gorbachev.

13—A published TASS statement said that "the concern about democracy, and this is how Washington's treatment of Panama is being portrayed, is nothing other than intervention in internal affairs and contempt for the elementary standards of international law. The recent dangerous escalation of the U.S. military presence in this country in the Panama Canal Zone has alarmed the international community."

17-19—The 12th annual meeting of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council was held in Washington. Five documents on cooperation were signed. A general resolution was passed on the results of the annual meeting. M.S. Gorbachev sent his greetings to those present at the meeting.

17—The Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union and the largest U.S. news agency, the ASSOCIATED PRESS, concluded a new agreement on cooperation. The agreement, which will go into effect on 1 January this year, envisages the extensive exchange of information and photo-journalistic materials between the sides. The agreement was concluded for a period of 5 years and will then be renewed each year.

24—E.A. Shevardnadze received U.S. Ambassador J. Matlock at his request.

29—The first meeting of sister cities in the USSR and the United States began in Tashkent. M.S. Gorbachev and G. Bush sent messages to the gathering.

The new U.S. proposals at the talks on conventional arms were published. These proposals envisage the establishment of equal limits on the land-based arms of NATO and

the Warsaw Pact (each side will retain 20,000 tanks, 28,000 armored personnel carriers, and from 16,500 to 24,000 artillery weapons; furthermore, the weapons included in the reductions must be destroyed); the reduction of land-based combat planes and helicopters in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals to 15 percent below the present NATO level; a 20-percent reduction in American troops in Western Europe, accompanied by a limit of approximately 275,000 on U.S. and USSR land and airborne forces located outside national boundaries in the zone from the Atlantic to the Urals, with all servicemen included in the reductions to be demobilized; the conclusion of agreements within 6 months to a year and the completion of the reductions by 1992 or 1993.

June

3—The latest round of Soviet-American consultations between USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.L. Adamishin and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs J. Cohen took place in Rome. During the conversations the sides expressed their views in detail on several questions connected with the situation on the African continent.

4—The schooner "Vega," with 40 American and Soviet citizens aboard, sailed out of New York harbor. They represent various occupations and nationalities and will all serve as crew members during the vessel's voyage of more than a month across the Atlantic Ocean from New York to Leningrad.

6—Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers V.M. Kamentsev received A. Hammer. They discussed questions connected with the development of cooperation, including joint ventures on USSR territory by Soviet organizations with the Occidental Petroleum firm and several other American companies.

8—During his first official press conference in the White House, President G. Bush of the United States said that the work of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR had confirmed the Soviet Union's adherence to the new thinking. Bush visited the Soviet embassy in Washington in connection with the official period of state mourning announced in the USSR and signed the book of condolences in the embassy.

9—An applied science conference on USSR-U.S. trade was held at Hofstra University (Long Island).

12—Four teams of physicians, specialists in the treatment of burns, and three teams of intermediate medical personnel arrived in Ufa from the United States to help the victims of the accident on the Chelyabinsk-Ufa railroad.

Member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Ye.K. Ligachev received D. Cristal, chairman of the board of Bankers Trust (Iowa), at his request when he was in the USSR in connection with the agreement on broader and stronger bilateral economic ties in agricultural production. They discussed the prospects for joint ventures in the processing of agricultural products.

12-22—In accordance with an earlier agreement, Admiral W. Crowe, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. Armed Forces, came to the Soviet Union on an official visit as the guest of Army Gen M.A. Moiseyev, chief of General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces and first deputy minister of defense. An agreement between the governments of the USSR and the United States on the prevention of dangerous military activity was signed on 12 June. On 21 June Admiral Crowe had a meeting in the Kremlin with M.S. Gorbachev. They discussed prospects for the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and armed forces in Europe.

13—In the Kremlin, A.I. Lukyanov received a delegation from the Federal Election Commission of the United States, headed by its chairman, D. McDonald, and invited to the USSR by the Central Electoral Commission for Elections of People's Deputies of the USSR.

14—The Senate of the U.S. Congress confirmed R. Burt's appointment as head of the U.S. delegation at the talks with the USSR on nuclear and space weapons and leader of the group on strategic arms.

15—Aeroflot and Pan-American World Airways officially announced the considerable expansion of their joint commercial activity. The two giant airlines decided to increase the number of weekly flights between the USSR and United States to eight as the first step in this direction. Half of them will be direct flights with no stopovers.

19—The meeting of Ambassador Yu.K. Nazarkin and Ambassador R. Burt, the heads of the delegations in Geneva, marked the beginning of a new round of the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons.

George Bush issued a statement in Washington in connection with the beginning of the latest round of talks. The document stresses that the instructions to the American delegation, approved by the President, reaffirm most of the statements made in the treaty drafted at the talks by the previous administration on the reduction of American and Soviet strategic offensive arms by 50 percent.

21—Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee V.A. Medvedev received a delegation of executives from the American CBS television broadcasting company, headed by CBS President D. Burke. They discussed broader cooperation in the exchange of information between Soviet television and CBS.

23—In Washington, 65 children from the USSR and the United States gathered for a conference they called a summit meeting, in the sense that members of their generation will be the leaders of these states in the 21st century. Peace, human rights, and ecology were the topics discussed at the conference.

24—A plenary meeting of the group on strategic offensive arms was held at the Soviet-American talks on nuclear and space weapons in Geneva. The Soviet side made some practical observations on methods of settling unresolved issues connected with the agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive arms by 50 percent, particularly with

regard to submarine-launched cruise missiles, heavy bombers and their weapons, and mobile ICBM launchers.

26—The Soviet-American talks on the limitation of nuclear tests were resumed in Geneva after a long interval.

27—In a NEW YORK TIMES interview, G. Bush said: "I believe that our relations with the Soviets on the whole are moving, however tentatively, in the right direction." In his opinion, his "administration could have a productive relationship with the Soviet leadership."

27-28—The latest Soviet-American consultations on the Asian-Pacific zone were held in Washington. They were attended by USSR Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs I.A. Rogachev and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Yu.V. Dubinin on the Soviet side, and by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Kimmitt and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs R. Solomon on the American side.

29—Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Bessmertnykh received American financier G. Soros. They had a lengthy talk about the present state and future prospects of political, trade, and economic relations between the USSR and the United States.

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